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iThe project ‘Managing trypanocide resistance in the cotton zone of West Africa: A co-ordinated regional 
study’ seeks to ensure the future efﬁcacy of trypanocides as an effective component of improved integrated 
trypanosomosis control strategies in the region. To achieve this goal, national research and development
institutions, international and regional research centres, and German universities are working in partnership
to develop farm-level and regional strategies for reducing the risk of trypanocide resistance. The emphasis
is on improving informational and technical supports to farmers, service providers, veterinary professionals
and policy-makers that will promote integrated control and rational trypanocide use to reduce the long-term
risk of resistance, without compromising the ability of livestock keepers to protect their livestock from the 
debilitating effects of trypanosomosis.
The project is being implemented in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea by the International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI) in collaboration with:
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
University of Hannover, Germany
Centre International de Recherche-Développement sur l’Elevage en Zone subhumide (CIRDES), Bobo-
Dioulasso, Burkina Faso
International Trypanotolerance Centre (ITC), The Gambia
Direction Provinciale des Ressources Animales (DPRA), Burkina Faso 
Programme National de Gestion de la Terroir (PNGT), Burkina Faso
Laboratoire Central Vétérinaire (LCV), Mali
Institut d’Economie Rurale/Centre Régional de la Recherche Agricole Sikasso (IER/CRRA), Mali
Unité de Lutte contre la Trypnocomose (ULCT), Mali
Direction Nationale de l’Elevage et l’Institut de Recherche Agronomique de Guinée (DNE/IRAG), 
Guinea-Conakry
Service de Lutte contre la Trypanosomiase Animale et les Vecteurs (SLTAV), Côte d’Ivoire
Institut National Polytechnique Houmphouey Boigney (INPHB)
The three-year project, which began in March 2002, is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and managed by GTZ (GTZ Project Number 2001.7860.8 – 001.00; 
Contract Number: 81052542).
This series of Working Papers is intended as a medium for presenting preliminary analysis and results being
generated under the project.
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vKey ﬁndings
Nine months after the start of a participatory trypanosomosis control project in south-western Burkina Faso, 
farmers and project staff together evaluated the process and results.
We found that the minimalist vector-control option chosen by farmers was considered by them effective 
enough to deliver important livelihood beneﬁts. The high-level participatory approach used by the project 
was more effective than low-level participatory approaches followed in other vector-control projects in
Burkina Faso. Vector control was delivered by a variety of existing and farmer-formed institutions, again with
more success than the formulaic Farmers Associations approach used in previous control projects.
We found that farmers integrate community-based vector control with a range of endogenous strategies—
speciﬁcally, risk reduction, trypanotolerant cattle and use of medicines—communities see vector control as 
an add-on rather than a substitute for other control methods, lowering incentives for long-term control.
After nine months of project support, farmers felt they had the technical skills to continue with control
and were reasonably conﬁdent in the capacity of local institutions to deliver control, but had considerable 
reservations over the affordability of control.
Farmers cannot easily convert the beneﬁts of vector control to cash, dramatically limiting their valuation of 
beneﬁts. Real costs and perceived beneﬁts are ﬁnely balanced; vector control without external support is
worth around USD 10 to farmers and costs them from USD 7–16.
The high transaction costs of vector control (in particular, the costs of obtaining information, obtaining inputs,
establishing and maintaining community institutions, monitoring and enforcing contributions) also reduce 
its attractiveness, but these were considered less important constraints than the perception that community
control is poor value for money.
Prevention may be better than cure, but it is much harder to sell to poor farmers; in all villages, farmers 
preferred use of curative medicines to vector control. We predict this will continue to be the case even at 
higher levels of resistance. Reﬂecting this prioritization, communities preferred trypanosomosis control
interventions based on Rational Drug Use to those based on vector control.
Despite the constraints to vector control, all communities paid for and placed screens after the project 
handed over activities, the ﬁrst time to our knowledge that this has happened in Burkina Faso and an
indication that sustainability may, under certain circumstances, be attainable. Despite this short-term success, 
both project and communities have reservations over the future of community-based control.
We conclude that if this option is to be pursued, external support will be needed.
11 Introduction and summary
Summary
This report discusses the participatory evaluation of a community-based trypanosomosis control project 
in southwest Burkina Faso. Participatory trypanosomosis control is an important livestock development 
strategy; often shown to be effective, its sustainability has still to be demonstrated. This evaluation took place 
after participating communities had taken full charge of control, allowing farmer perception of impacts and 
integration of innovations with existing control strategies to be assessed from a perspective of potential for 
long-term viability and adoption. 
Control of trypanosomosis
A century after being identiﬁed, trypanosomosis remains the major health problem for livestock in sub-
Saharan African and a signiﬁcant cause of human sickness and death. Tsetse ﬂies, the principal vector of 
trypanosomosis, infest a third of sub-Saharan Africa putting at risk 60 million cattle and 50 million people.1
Livestock keepers have traditionally managed trypanosomosis at community and individual-level by avoiding
high risk areas, keeping animals which resist disease and using medicines. These endogenous (emic or 
community-based) strategies have allowed continuous growth in cattle populations and the innovation of 
traction-based farming systems, but losses from trypanosomosis remain unacceptably high. In response to 
these losses, estimated at billions of dollars annually,2 development actors have introduced exogenous (etic)
strategies, largely centred on vector control.
Initially tsetse control was by destruction of their habitat or removal of their alternative hosts. The growth 
of African states saw these indiscriminating methods replaced by ground or aerial spraying of insecticides,
delivered by large-scale national programs. As for other state services, tsetse programs became increasingly
dysfunctional with the onset of the Great African Depression in the 1980s. The combination of resource 
constraints, disillusionment with top-down, statist development, and environmental concerns over area-
wide insecticide spraying created supply-driven incentives for new delivery systems of vector control. The 
technical innovation of small-scale vector control using baits (traps or cattle treated with insecticide) met 
these demands. Control could be delivered by communities at local level in environmentally-friendly ways 
consonant with the new orthodoxy of participation and sustainability, while decreasing the ﬁnancial burden
on over-extended states. With these incentives, bait methods were quickly adopted and widely applied.
Twenty years later, institutionalization at either community or state-level remains elusive, and spontaneous
uptake by farmers rare; not surprisingly, in recent years there has been increasing questioning of participatory
vector control as a viable means of control.
It should not be forgotten that vector control has always been a minority option. Less than 2% of tsetse 
infested land has been cleared by vector control since the 1970s and trypanocides remain the dominant
strategy for disease management.3 The emergence of resistance to trypanocides threatens this lead strategy 
and prompts the reappraisal of trypanosomosis control.
Project background
In this context, a regional project ‘Improving the management of drug resistance in the cotton zone of West 
Africa: A coordinated regional approach’4 aims to safeguard trypanocides in order to sustain and improve 
the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in West Africa. One of the objectives is the evaluation of ‘best-bet’ 
strategies for the management of trypanosomosis in areas under risk of resistance. In Burkina Faso, two 
strategies are being assessed, community-based vector control and training of farmers in Rational Drug Use 
(RDU).5
Many participatory vector control projects have taken place in Burkina Faso and in none has control survived 
the departure of the project. It was hypothesized that a higher level of participation would improve long-term
viability, and the current project emphasized farmer analysis, farmer decision-making (including freedom 
to take actions seen by technical advisors as wrong or inadvisable), farmer payment for running costs and
2rapid phase-out of active project intervention. All ﬁnancial support ended after six months and communities
are now entirely responsible for organizing, carrying out and ﬁnancing activities. Project staff remain to give 
advice and to measure the effectiveness, impact and viability of the strategies. Two months after the hand-
over of vector control to farmers the participatory evaluation described here was carried out in each of the 
four villages.
Participatory evaluation
Participatory evaluation or stakeholder assessment is one of a family of participatory approaches to 
emerge in the past few decades; in theory and practice it is closely linked to Participatory Learning and
Action (subsuming Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)), Participatory
Action Research and Farmer Participatory Research.6 These approaches are characterized by qualitative 
methodologies and process orientation; they valorize subsidiarity, decentralization and empowerment of 
communities. Active participation of project beneﬁciaries is seen both as a means and an end—that is, as a 
beneﬁciary entitlement and an effective way of development. Participatory evaluation applies the ideology
of participatory development to the activity of assessing projects or interventions. As such it differs from 
conventional evaluation in important respects (summarized in Box 1).
Box 1: Conventional evaluation and participatory evaluation compared7
Conventional evaluation Participatory evaluation
What Pre-determined indicators of success Indicators chosen by stakeholders
How Focus on objectivity; use of standardized,
complex, largely quantitative data collection
and analysis; delayed and limited access 
to results
Focus on self evaluation; simple, qualitative data 
collection and analysis; open and immediate
sharing of results
Who External experts Community, project, other stakeholders
When One-off, usually at end of project Iterative, small-scale evaluation
Why Accountability to funders; lesson learning
for external audience; deciding if funding continues
Accountability to community; lesson learning for 
internal audience; empowerment of stakeholders
The high-level participatory approach followed by the project predicated a participatory approach to 
evaluation. This report describes the process and ﬁndings as well as discussing the use of participatory
evaluation in community-based trypanosomosis projects.
32 Farmer impressions of project interventions
Ex ante appraisal
The integrated approach followed by the project had two lead interventions: support to community-based
vector control and training of farmers in the Rational Use of Drugs.8 Each intervention comprised a ‘basket of 
choices’ of different tactics. During a participatory planning workshop (described in working paper 3 in this
series), farmers analysed these options and chose those they felt were most suited to their needs and means.
Available tactics
Screens are pieces of cloth treated with insecticide to kill ﬂies. At the planning workshop, farmers had a 
choice of whether to use screens and, if so, the number of screens to use and the number of treatments to 
give. 
Traps are cloth constructions which attract and kill tsetse ﬂies. They cost more than screens but have been
recommended as superior to screens (because farmers can see the dead ﬂies in the traps encouraging
them to continue control).
Animal baits: Animals treated with insecticide attract and kill tsetse. 
Insecticides are applied as a dilute solution sprayed on the animal using
pumps or a more concentrated formula poured on the back of the animal
(pour-on). Sprays need to be applied more frequently, and require water 
and spraying apparatus; the process of spraying takes several minutes and
is sometimes resented by the animal. Pour-ons are easy and quick to apply, 
no equipment is needed, and applications are less frequent.
Training in Rational Drug Use: Trypanocides are the most widely used strategy for trypanosomosis
control and the great majority of treatments are given by farmers. Incorrect use of trypanocides lessens
effectiveness, wastes money and fosters chemo-resistance.
Farmers’ choices
The farmers ranked their preference for the different interventions; the results are summarized in Table 1 
below.
Traps were not chosen. From the beginning, farmers reported cost was a major issue and the much higher
cost of traps relative to screens was considered to outweigh the advantage of direct monitoring of ﬂy-kill.
Screens were chosen by all villages, but, reﬂecting pre-occupations with cost, all villages chose a minimalist
strategy where screens were placed only in areas of high risk and re-treated with insecticide only once a 
year, rather than the more intensive and more effective approaches using larger numbers of screens and more 
frequent treatments, which had been used in previous projects.
Three villages chose to use insecticide sprays on cattle which, though more difﬁcult to use, are much less 
expensive than pour-ons. One village chose to treat cattle with pour-ons, however, after the ﬁrst treatment
they switched to sprays, as they found pour-ons were too expensive.
All villages chose training in Rational Drug Use. Village experts chosen by the villagers using criteria agreed 
by the project attended a 7-day residential course. In addition, animal health clinics were held in the villages,
open to all farmers. During these clinics, practical training was given on the diagnosis and treatment of 
diseases.
•
•
•
•
Rational Drug Use 
occurs when medicines
appropriate for the disease,
are administered correctly, 
for adequate time periods
and at the lowest cost to the 
client and the community.
4Table 1. Ex ante appraisal of trypanosomosis control strategies by farmers
Rejected Accepted Rank1
Pour-ons Sprays 3
High level use of screens Low level use of screens 2
Traps Training in RDU 1
1. Rank of 1 indicates most preferred.
Conclusion
Previous projects on vector control had concentrated on developing and demonstrating technical efﬁcacy. In
these, strategies for vector control were chosen by project ‘experts’ using technical criteria and monitoring
focused on epidemiological and entomological parameters.9 The projects showed that vector control was 
technically effective; however, long-term adoption was never achieved. Our ex ante appraisal of strategies
by farmers found that they traded off technical efﬁcacy against cost and preferred strategies that were less 
effective but more affordable. Farmers are more interested in improving the use of their existing strategies (use 
of medicines) than in novel strategies (screens and pour-ons).
Post hoc appraisal
During the participatory evaluation farmers assessed the strategies they had chosen. It can be seen in Table 2 
that order of preference was little changed from the ex ante appraisal, supporting the principle that farmers 
are good judges of which strategies will prove most acceptable to them. Rational Drug Use interventions
were more preferred than community-based vector control interventions. This may reﬂect community doubts 
over the sustainability or beneﬁts of vector control.
Table 2. Farmer evaluation of project interventions
Intervention Rank1 Strong points Weak points
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Training village
experts
1 Useful information
Level of training appropriate
Place of training was too far from the 
village
Village clinics 2 Treatments worked well
All farmers were involved
Cattle holding grounds are not
adequate in some villages
C
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Sprays 3 The product was effective
Other diseases decreased
No sprays were provided by the 
project, so farmers used sprays for 
treating cotton—these were sometimes
damaged
Screens 4 Noticeable decreases in biting
insects, humans also were less
bitten
Delay in placing screens
Organizing the work caused some 
problems
Pour-ons 5 Easy to use Not affordable
1. Rank of 1 indicates most preferred.
The only change in ranking from the ex ante appraisal was in the respective positions of sprays and screens.
Screens were preferred ex ante but after experience with control, sprays were preferred. Enthusiasm and
interest in new technologies may have led farmers to over-value this approach in the ex ante assessment.
However, when farmers rank sprays, it is likely that they are ranking sprays for combined tick and tsetse 
control rather than for tsetse control alone. Further exploration showed that farmers have a high willingness
to use sprays at times of the year when ticks are a problem, but a much lower willingness to use sprays when
ticks are not a problem. Many farmers will not use sprays to control tsetse, but will use sprays to control tsetse 
as well as other ectoparasites.
5Box 2: Resistance to trypanocides
Chemo-resistance is the ability of pathogens to survive exposure to a deﬁned concentration of an anti-
microbial substance. Resistance to antimicrobials is an ineluctable natural phenomenon; resistance has 
existed since before the introduction of antimicrobials to medicine and occurs to all substances used in
non-negligible amounts. Resistance is fostered by high quantity and poor quality of use, particularly by 
under-dosage of drugs and irregular treatment intervals. While high quantity of use may be justiﬁed, poor 
quality of use is invariably counter-productive.
Resistance to trypanocides has been reported since the 1920s10 and is of growing importance. The most 
widely used animal trypanocides—diminazene aceturate (DIM) and isometamidium chloride (ISMM)—are 
nearly half a century old and resistance to these is now widespread. Given the high cost of new drug 
development (estimates vary from USD 200 to 800 million)11 and the low value of the African market 
for trypanocides (USD 20 to 40 million), new products are unlikely to be developed in the short term. 
Resistance to trypanocides can reach very high levels, up to 100% of isolates in some studies; multiple
drug resistance has been reported from more than eight countries, including Burkina Faso. Guidelines
for managing resistance to trypanocides have been developed, but have yet to be widely disseminated or 
meaningfully applied, and awareness and understanding of the issue remain limited.
63 Participation
Participation in project activities
There was a high level of participation by farmers in vector control implemented with project support, 
with the great majority of farmers being involved in the treatment and placement of screens and in the 
synchronized spraying of animals. This resulted in good rates of placement and recovery of screens: all 
screens were placed and 99% of screens were retrieved before the rainy season. Participation in spraying
varied from a maximum of 88% of all cattle (season of high tick infestation and subsidized insecticides) to a 
minimum of 44% of cattle (low tick infestation and full cost recovery of insecticide).
Level of participation
Participation can occur at many levels and practitioners have recommended that the term should always 
be qualiﬁed by indicating the level of participation. Several frameworks exist for this and Table 3 gives an
example adapted for community-based vector control.
Table 3. Levels of participation12
Participation Involvement
Passive People are told that a vector control project is happening in their area 
Extractive People answer questions in an extractive one-way process, but results are not shared
Enquiring People are consulted on the problem. External agents deﬁne solutions but may modify them 
as a result of community views
Paid for People provide resources or labour in return for incentives, e.g. give work for subsidized
screens, bring cattle for subsidized treatments
Functional People participate by forming groups to carry out pre-determined project objectives 
Interactive People participate in joint analysis and in forming new or transforming existing institutions
for vector control. They have real control over decision making
Self-mobilization People take the initiative to form and transform vector-control institutions independently of 
the external agent. External agent provides advice if and as requested
A review of previous community-based projects in Burkina Faso revealed that participation was at the lower 
levels of participation (enquiring, paid-for or at best functional participation) and it was hypothesized that 
this contributed to the observed low levels of sustainability. In the current project, higher level participation
was intended and the assessment by farmers suggests that this was largely achieved. Farmers were asked 
to identify the actor in charge of different stages of the project, and responses were classiﬁed as ‘outsiders’
(project staff, state veterinary services, CIRDES staff etc.) or as ‘villagers’ (farmers, local leaders, para-
veterinarians etc.). Table 4 shows the responses of farmers in villages where the current project is working
compared to the responses of farmers in villages where previous lower-level participatory projects had 
worked.
Table 4. Villager perceptions of who was in charge of different steps in the project cycle
Previous Projects (n = 8) Current project (n = 4)
Villagers Outsiders Villagers Outsiders
Identiﬁcation 75% 25% 100% 0
Financing 0–30% 100–70% 100% 0
Management 0% 100% 100% 0
Activities 60% 40% 100% 0
7Proponents argue that participation is not only a moral obligation to beneﬁciaries, but also a more effective 
way of doing development. We found that process indicators for participation in vector control in this project 
were higher than in previous projects in Burkina Faso using less participatory methods, implying that high-
level participatory approaches are more effective than low-level participatory approaches (Table 5).
Table 5. Comparing levels of participation in the current project with previous projects in Burkina Faso
Screen retrieval Cattle sprayed Cost recovery
Padema 66% 30% 30%
Bondukuy N/A 8–16% < 20%
Satiri N/A 10–20% 68% (screens)
Sissili 77% 37% 16% of pledged
Current project 99% 44–88% 100% (sprays)
Problems with participation
Participation has advantages but is not a panacea, as the lack of long-term duration of participatory vector 
control amply demonstrates. Some problems with participation are due to lack of understanding of the 
methodology or lack of incentives to apply it. However, other problems seem intrinsic to the methodology. 
Factors which negatively inﬂuenced the quality and quantity of participatory products in this project were:
Partial participation: Communities are heterogeneous and sub-groups within communities have different
interests in, and capabilities for, participation. In the case of vector control, livestock-rich farmers beneﬁt
more than livestock-poor, also women and those without livestock receive indirect and less important
beneﬁts. We found that livestock-rich farmers participated signiﬁcantly more than livestock-poor (D = 
0.001). Partial participation and inequality in beneﬁt distribution can reduce both sustainability and
impact.
Costs of participation: Participation has opportunity costs and may not be affordable for the poorest and
the busiest. Our evaluation took place at the end of the harvest season and farmers had to leave this work 
to attend the meeting. During some evaluations, other communal activities were taking place at the same 
time, for example, road building and school meetings. The costs of participation place a burden on all 
and will inevitably exclude some, again reducing sustainability and impact.
Participation as negotiation: Participatory evaluations, like all participatory processes, are an arena for 
negotiation where discourse is a means of inﬂuence and expression as much as a means of providing
information. In the initial phase, we found that problem and solution identiﬁcation were heavily
inﬂuenced by communities’ expectations and experience of development. Similarly, information
contributed by communities in the evaluation was not a value-free presentation of objective facts, but 
coloured by communities’ satisfaction with project activities and their desire for the project to continue.
This probably led to an over-statement of the beneﬁts of the project.
Normative bias: In public events, construction of knowledge is inﬂuenced by accepted norms and
existing patterns of power. People are reluctant to discuss or admit to deviations from socially desirable 
behaviour. For example, communities reported that all farmers were involved in some activities, while
project records revealed participation, although high, was less than 100%. We found that contentious
issues such as unwillingness to participate and unwillingness-to-pay were better dealt with in informal
community groups or one-to-one dialogue than in the public process of PRA.
Participation in the evaluation
In total, 161 farmers from four villages participated in the evaluations (Table 6). This was similar to the 
attendance at the planning workshop (166 farmers participating), and shows a continuing high level of 
interest in community-based control. There was an average of 1 participant for every 1.3 cattle-keeping
households, a level of participation that compares well with that reported in other community-based projects. 
•
•
•
•
8Table 6. Participation in the evaluation by village and stakeholder group
Opinion
leaders
Large
 herds
Small
 herds Total
Ratio of participants to
cattle-keeping households
Sokoroine 8 16 12 36 1:2.3
Kotoura 20 11 15 46 2:1
Sokouraba 13 11 30 54 1:1.8
Mbie 14 combined group 11 25 1:1.1
94 Stakeholder assessment—methodology
Time, place and participants
The stakeholder assessment was carried out over ﬁve days—one day for planning and practice and one day 
for evaluation in each of the four villages. The project team consisted of a veterinarian, the three animators
working in the project villages and two sociologists. The evaluation was open to all villagers interested, and a 
total of 161 participated.
Tools and techniques
A mixture of tools was used for assessment focusing on the central issues of a) integrating control innovations
with current practice, b) evaluating impacts of control and c) assessing long-term viability of control.
(Technical effectiveness of control and impacts on animal health and production are being concurrently
measured by conventional epidemiological techniques, but results are not yet available for analysis.) In
participatory evaluations, indicators are chosen by communities and the criteria we used were those which 
communities had identiﬁed as most important and relevant for them. For example, in the participatory
planning workshop, farmers had used Pairwise Comparison Matrices to list and rank the beneﬁts anticipated
from vector control, and these indicators were used in assessing the impact of vector control. Sustainability
indicators were based on the ﬁndings of farmer researchers who visited other participatory projects in
Burkina Faso.
Analyses followed core PRA principles of visual analysis, semi-structured discussions, appropriate
imprecision and group work. 
Photo-cards were used in most of the analyses with pictures taken in the villages (Figure 1). Farmers found
these easy to understand and enjoyable to use.
Figure 1. Photo-card signifying trypanotolerant cattle.
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At the end of the analysis the participants interrogated the results (Figure 2). An advantage of visual methods 
of evaluation is that all participants can see the totality of the analysis. This allows rectiﬁcation of mistakes
and acts as a summary of the ﬁndings, facilitating learning and reﬂection.
Figure 2. Participants interrogating an analysis.
Process of the evaluation
Evaluations started with traditional greetings and presentation of all participants. Afterwards the objectives 
of the evaluation were agreed in plenary. It was emphasized that the evaluation was an opportunity for joint
reﬂection on the strong points, weak points and impacts of vector control. It would help the communities
assess for themselves the costs and efforts needed for control and the beneﬁts of control, and to decide if
it was in their interests to continue with control (sustainability of control). Finally, it was a time to discuss
problems encountered and collectively seek solutions.
Participants were divided into three groups: opinion leaders, livestock-rich farmers and livestock-poor 
farmers. In one village (Mbie) there were not livestock rich farmers and only two groups were formed, and for 
some analyses just one group. This increased the level of participation; when groups are smaller, more people 
can contribute. It also prevented the discussion being dominated by high-status participants (opinion leaders) 
and allowed differences between groups to emerge and be assessed.
Each group carried out the same analyses allowing comparison between groups and triangulation. If analyses
took longer than anticipated, then some analyses were omitted in order to give participants the time they 
needed. After the group analyses there was time for general discussion, conclusions and recommendations.
At the end, the project team and participants ate together, followed by a traditional closing ceremony.
In the evening, the project team met to discuss the process of facilitation, clarify and plan for the next day. 
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5 Integrated control of trypanosomosis
Integration of strategies
The ﬁrst analysis looked at how farmers integrated the control innovations introduced by the project with
their existing strategies of trypanosomosis control. Farmers ﬁrst listed their different options for control,
showing a wide repertoire of strategies. These were grouped in three categories: use of trypanotolerant
animals,1 reducing susceptibility to disease and use of medicines.
To these existing or endogenous strategies the project added vector-control innovations (exogenous strategies)
treating cattle with insecticide sprays or pour-on, and screens treated with insecticide. The project also 
supported the existing strategies of use of medicine by farmers and reduction of susceptibility to disease by 
giving training on Rational Use of Drugs, nutrition and other diseases.
Use of strategies
After identifying strategies, farmers used stones or objets trouvés to indicate the proportion of farmers using
the different strategies. Participants then indicated whether use of the strategy was likely to increase, decrease 
or stay the same in the future (Table 7).
1. Trypanotolerant cattle are taurine (humpless) breeds indigenous to west and central Africa, with a natural resistance to 
trypanosomosis as well as some other endemic diseases.
5. Screens
4. Sprays
  1. Trypanotolerant animals
Baoulé—pure trypanotolerant breed
Métis—stable cross between Zebu and
Baoulé—partially trypanotolerant
•
•
  2. Reducing susceptibility to disease
Avoid areas of known high ﬂy risk
Water animals at village pumps avoiding
high-risk areas
Nutrition and treatment of other disease
to increase ability to resist infection
•
•
•
  3. Medicines
ISMM, preventative trypanocide—‘Wine’
DIM, curative trypanocide—‘The yellow’
Tetracycline capsules for human use—‘Red head’
Tetracycline injection—‘Oil’
Traditional medicines
•
•
•
•
• Pour-ons
Box 3: Existing and novel strategies for control of trypanosomosis
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Table 7. Usage of trypanosomosis control strategies—Present and predicted
Livestock-rich Livestock-poor Future use
1. Trypanotolerant cattle + –
2. Avoid areas of risk +
3. Medicines ++
4a. Sprays +
4b. Pour-on 0
5. Screens +
(The proportion of the large solid square represents the proportion of farmers using the strategy, while future 
use is represented by plus (+) signs indicating increase in use, 0 indicating no change and (–) a decrease; (+ 
–) indicates divided opinion.)
This analysis showed a high level of integration of strategies: with the exceptions of pour-on insecticides and
risk avoidance, most farmers used all control strategies. Farmers were most conﬁdent about continuing with
medicines and trypanotolerant animals. The level of adoption of the exogenous vector-control strategies was 
high for screens and sprays. Pour-ons, however, were not adopted or considered to be likely to be used in
the future. This option was not popular because of its high cost; only one village had decided to use pour-ons
and they had stopped after the ﬁrst month.
For farmers, integrating several strategies rather than relying on one may be a way of reducing risks. However, 
integration has drawbacks as well as advantages. Farmer perception that other disease control strategies will
continue to be needed in the future reduces the incentives for adopting vector control.
Farmers went on to evaluate strategies according to the parameters they had earlier deﬁned as most important
for them, following the participatory principle of selection of evaluation criteria by the primary stakeholders. 
These criteria were efﬁcacy, ease of use and low cost or affordability. 
The project innovations of screens and sprays were regarded as having the highest level of efﬁcacy but 
lowest level of ease of use and affordability, not a good augur for sustainability. 
Use of medicines was an attractive strategy. Diminazene aceturate (DIM) scored highest for ease of 
use and affordability, and medium for efﬁcacy. ISMM scored worse than DIM on all three dimensions,
consistent with farmers report that DIM is used by 100% of farmers and ISMM by 38%. The moderate 
ratings for efﬁcacy are consistent with the fail rate of ISMM of nearly 40% and that of DIM, nearly 20%, 
found in chemo-resistance studies. Medicines are used even though farmers are aware of poor efﬁcacy; 
comparison with other strategies suggests they will continue to be used even at considerably higher levels 
of resistance. For example, the strategy of trypanotolerant animals was used by a majority of farmer even
though it was seen as not very effective. 
The main way of avoiding risk in these villages is watering the animals at dams or pumps instead of the 
river. This is regarded as only moderately effective, which is logical as it is not always possible to avoid
tsetse especially in the rainy season when ﬂy habitats expand. In terms of ease of use and affordability, 
farmers said dams would be very easy to use and affordable if they existed, but to construct them would 
be neither easy nor affordable, hence the low ranking given. Watering large herds at village pumps is not
practical and none of the livestock-rich farmers were able to adopt this strategy.
•
•
•
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Use of trypanotolerant cattle is easy and affordable, but not regarded as very effective. The fact that 
trypanosomosis occurs in trypanotolerant animals (although the disease is much milder) may have 
led farmers to give a low efﬁcacy rating to this strategy. The ﬁrst phase of the project found that the 
prevalence of trypanosomosis in trypanotolerant animals was broadly comparable to that in Zebus.13
Livestock wealth did not have a large inﬂuence on ranking; the main difference being that livestock-poor 
farmers regarded trypanotolerant cattle as being more effective but less easy and less affordable. This can
be explained by the different farming systems. Livestock-rich farmers keep female animals and a mixture
of trypanotolerant cattle and Zebus; they can easily and cheaply change the herd composition by selective 
breeding. Small farmers do not have cows and to change the herd composition they must buy trypanotolerant
animals, which is expensive and not always easy.
Table 8. Ranking of strategies by farmers (with 1 considered the best)
Livestock-rich farmers Livestock-poor farmers
Efﬁcacy Ease of use Affordability Efﬁcacy Ease of use Affordability
1 Screens DIM DIM 1 Screens DIM DIM
2 Spray Trypanotolerant Trypanotolerant 2 Spray ISMM ISMM
3 DIM ISMM ISMM 3 Trypanotolerant Spray Spray
4 Risk avoidance Spray Spray 4 DIM Screens Screens
5 ISMM Screens Screens 5 ISMM Trypanotolerant Trypanotolerant
6 Trypanotolerant Risk avoidance Risk avoidance 6 Risk avoidance Risk avoidance Risk avoidance
It can be seen that there is no one best-bet strategy; each method has advantages and disadvantages and the 
blend of strategies chosen will vary with individual needs and capabilities, as well as the changing external
context.
Adoption of strategies: Trade-offs and dynamic equilibriums
We went on to look in more detail at the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. This showed that farmers 
have an excellent understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different control strategies; the level 
of adoption of a strategy depends on trade-offs between beneﬁts and costs. Thus adoption choices represent a 
dynamic equilibrium that ﬂexibly shifts with changing incentives and disincentives, be they economic, socio-
cultural, epidemiological or environmental.
Strategies with major advantages and tolerable disadvantages are used by all farmers. For example, all farmers 
use DIM because it works, is widely available and the cost relative to the negative impacts of the disease is
low. ISMM, which is more expensive and less effective, is used by fewer farmers.
•
Incentives to adoption
Most effective treatment
Gives protection (short 
duration)
Affordable
Quick acting
Disincentives to adoption
Some products are ineffective
Cost is high
Medicine not available in the village
Diminazene
100% adoption
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For strategies which have more disadvantages, the level of adoption represents a point of equilibrium in the 
trade-off between advantages and disadvantages. For example, the main advantage of trypanotolerant animals
(disease resistance) is balanced against their poor proﬁtability, perceived lower production and temperament
less suited to draft or herding. No farmers used keeping trypanotolerant animals as their only strategy for 
disease management although this was an option open to all, and a reasonably effective one.
For other strategies, adoption was constrained by external factors beyond the control of farmers. For example, 
farmers know that using pumps and dams for watering animals (instead of the streams where tsetse ﬂies are 
found) will reduce the disease. Use of this strategy is limited by the low availability of water infrastructure 
suitable for use by animals and the prohibitively high cost of building it.
This analysis indicates that some strategies are already optimized given the constraints of environment and
farmer resources. If strategies are optimized for the prevailing conditions, there is little place for project 
interventions.
Lead strategies
The strategies which farmers used widely at present and thought would be most important in the future, 
namely use of medicines and trypanotolerant cattle, were further explored. Farmers carried out a visioning
analysis to describe the future herd structure (Table 9). This found that villagers anticipated a large increase in
Disincentives to adoption
Poor sale price
Bad tempered
Less production of milk
Difﬁcult to guard and stray often
Not always available
Incentives to adoption
Resist trypanosomosis and other 
diseases
Cheap to buy
Powerful and work hard
Long lived
Baoulé
50% adoption
Disincentives to adoption
Dams and pumps are very limited
Conﬂicts with arable farmers
Young herders do not know high-
risk areas 
High-risk areas have good grazing
Pumps cannot be used for large 
herds
Incentives to adoption
Also avoids biting ﬂies and
injuries from falling in holes
Other maladies are reduced
Risk avoidance
12% adoption
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Métis, a smaller increase in Zebus and no change in Baoulé. Thus in relative terms the population of Baoulé 
will decline.
Table 9. Changes in herd structure in future years
Mbie Sokoroine Sokouraba Kotoura
Zebu + + – +
Métis ++ ++ ++ ++
Baoulé – – – (+) –
Use of trypanotolerant animals is a potential solution to the problem of resistance. However, it seems that 
even at the very high levels of resistance present in the project villages (40% failure of ISMM and nearly 20% 
failure of DIM) are not sufﬁcient to incentivize a general shift back to pure trypanotolerant animals given their
other perceived disadvantages. However, one group of farmers (livestock-rich) in one village with high levels 
of resistance (Sokouraba) did foresee an increase in pure trypanotolerant cattle. 
Use of medicines was also looked at in more depth. Many different medicines are used for trypanosomosis
control. These can be divided into three categories.
1. Effective modern drugs
Diminazene aceturate (DIM) is a modern trypanocide of proven efﬁcacy which is used as a curative 
when individual animals are sick. Many generics are available and, for some of these, product quality is
believed to be a problem.
Isometamidium chloride (ISMM) is also a modern trypanocide which is used mainly as a preventative—
giving protection for 2 to 3 months. Only two generics are available and quality is less of a problem. 
However, chemo-resistance is more severe than for DIM, probably linked to its longer persistence in
treated animals.
2. Ineffective modern drugs
Antibiotics are not effective against trypanosomosis but tetracycline injections may have some beneﬁcial
effects if other diseases are present. Tetracycline capsules for human use are widely available on the 
informal market and frequently used for animals. These are administered orally or dissolved in water 
and injected. Given orally, they are ineffective as they are inactivated by rumen micro-organisms; given
as an injection, they may be effective against secondary infections (but evidence for this is lacking).
Tetracyclines are particularly sensitive to light and heat; many products sold have been exposed to both 
for long periods and are probably ineffective.
Two categories of tablets are widely available: anti-worm drugs and minerals. Farmers do not know 
brand names and use colour to distinguish tablets—green tablets are most likely to contain albendazole,
•
•
•
•
Box 4: Trypanotolerant cattle
The major types of trypanotolerant cattle are Hamitic Longhorns (N’Dama) and Shorthorns (several 
breeds including Baoulé). Recent molecular genetic studies revealed an origin within the African
continent for trypanotolerant cattle.14 The Métis is deﬁned variously with some authors considering
it a stable breed formed from crossing Zebu and trypanotolerant cattle, and others using it as a 
synonym of cross-breed to refer to ﬁrst generation crosses between Zebus and trypanotolerant
breeds. In recent decades, Zebu cattle have expanded southwards, N’Dama populations have 
grown, and crossing of Zebu and trypanotolerant cattle has increased.15 There has been concern that 
farmer preference for Métis will result in the loss of trypanotolerant genes and there is evidence for 
increasing genetic introgression of Zebu into trypanotolerant populations.
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orange tablets to contain levamisole, yellow tablets to contain levamisole or tetramisole, white tablets to 
contain oxfendazole or vitamins, grey and brown tablets to contain minerals; it was not always possible
to ascertain which tablets were used. However, neither anti-worm drugs nor vitamins are effective against
trypanosomosis, but as for antibiotics, may help if other diseases are present. (Iron may be of some use in
case of anaemia and has been marketed as an adjunct to trypanosomosis treatment.) Tablets are generally 
sold without the original packaging and are easy to fake, so, as for tetracyclines, it is possible that drugs 
given may not contain active ingredients.
3. Traditional medicines
Many different traditional medicines are used and it is plausible that some contain active principles but 
there has been little research on traditional medicines and as yet no clear evidence of efﬁcacy.
Use of drugs for trypanosomosis control
Table 10 reports the share of farmers participating in the evaluation using different types of drugs to control
trypanosomosis. The most widely used drug, DIM, is also the most effective; farmer attitude in preferring
DIM is rational. ISMM is less widely used. This is also rational: experts recommend that when resistance is
widespread, prophylactic treatments with ISMM should be discontinued and only clinically sick animals
treated.16 Traditional medicines are used widely and conﬁdently; in light of this, their efﬁcacy deserves further 
investigation. However, it should be borne in mind that many farmers also use modern drugs which have no
efﬁcacy against trypanosomosis, so use cannot be taken as an indicator of efﬁcacy. 
Table 10. Percentage of farmers using drugs for the control of trypanosomosis
Livestock-rich Livestock-poor
DIM 100% 100%
Traditional medicines 93% 62%
Tablets 57% 62%
ISMM 38% 71%
Tetracycline capsules 30% 50%
Tetracycline injection 3% 44%
The effect of using non-trypanocidal drugs, whether modern or traditional, depends on the accuracy of farmer 
of diagnosis. If farmer diagnosis is correct, use of non-trypanocidal drugs will result in ﬁnancial loss to the 
farmer (price of drug and avoidable losses from disease). If the diagnosis is incorrect and the drug chosen is,
by chance, active against the disease actually present, then cures may be obtained. In either case, there will
be no effects on the development of resistance to trypanocides. Ongoing studies carried out by this project 
indicate that farmer diagnosis is relatively accurate.
Livestock ownership and use of drugs
Livestock-poor farmers are more likely to use ineffective modern medicines (antibiotics and tablets). They 
have less expertise than livestock-rich farmers and less interaction with veterinary services. Informal market 
sellers often incorrectly recommend tablets as a treatment for trypanosomosis and livestock-poor farmers are 
more likely to follow this advice, especially as tablets are easier to give than the trypanocidal drugs, which 
need to be injected.
Traditional medicines are used more by livestock-rich farmers. In one village (Sokouraba), none of the 
livestock-poor farmers (many of which have often only recently started to keep cattle) knew how to prepare 
traditional medicines, but said they would use them if they knew how to. In this village, all the livestock-rich 
farmers used traditional medicines, suggesting that communication even within villages can be problematic.
ISMM (a preventative drug, recommended for herd treatment) is used more by livestock-poor farmers. For 
livestock-rich farmers, it would be very expensive to treat all the animals in the herd, and treatments are 
usually restricted to the most valuable animals. For farmers with a small number of draft animals, prophylaxis
•
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is more affordable and also more urgent, as they do not have surplus animals they can use if their cattle fall 
sick. 
Effectiveness, ease of use and cost of drugs
Farmers went on to analyse the efﬁcacy, ease of use and cost of drugs (Table 11). In terms of efﬁcacy, 
modern trypanocides are seen as most effective in nearly all villages, with DIM scoring higher than ISMM. 
Interestingly, traditional medicines are seen to be relatively ineffective, they were regarded as equally or less 
effective than tablets and tetracycline, which have no trypanocidal properties.
Table 11. Ranking of different products used for trypanosomosis control in the four villages, according to criteria deﬁned 
by farmers (where 1 is the most highly rated)
Kotoura Sokouraba
Product Efﬁcacy Ease Cost Efﬁcacy Ease Cost
Wine 3 5 5 3 6 5
Tablets 4 1 3 4 3 3
Yellow 1 4 4 1 4 4
Red head 2 2 2 5 2 2
Traditional 5 3 1 6 1 1
Oil 6 6 6 2 5 6
Mbie Sokoroine
Efﬁcacy Ease Cost Efﬁcacy Ease Cost
Wine 2 5 5 2 5 5
Tablets 4 3 3 6 3 3
Yellow 1 4 4 1 4 4
Red head 6 2 2 3 2 2
Traditional 5 1 1 5 1 1
Oil 3 6 6 4 6 6
However, traditional medicines score high on low cost and ease of use. In only one village did farmers report 
problems in obtaining and preparing the products. The inappropriate modern medicines for trypanosomosis
(i.e. tablets and tetracycline capsules) were also regarded by the farmers as relatively ineffective. But, they 
scored highly on ease of use. These products are given orally unlike the effective modern trypanocides which 
must be reconstituted with water and injected.
The ranking of costs in Table 11 was the same for all four villages showing that farmers are well informed
on price differentials. The ranks correspond to the prices of the products based on market surveys (shown in
Table 12) in which visits were made to 4 of the 10 veterinary practices in the area and prices ascertained. This
triangulation supports the accuracy of farmer ranking.
Table 12. Prices of veterinary drugs
Local name Product
Unit price
(FCFA)
Price per dose
(FCFA)
Traditional drugs 0 0
Red head Tetracycline capsules 10 100
Tablets Wormer or minerals 150–500 100–250
The yellow DIM 550 460
Wine ISMM 550 550
Oil Tetracycline injections 4500 1125
Note: Prices collected during market surveys of formal drug sellers in early 2004.
18
For farmers, the ideal medication would be a one-dose oral preparation that is effective, inexpensive and
can be obtained in the village. In the absence of such a product, farmers are likely to continue to use 
ineffective products that have other desirable properties such as low cost, widespread availability and ease of 
administration, as well as the more effective products.
Figure 3. The informal sector provides drugs that are readily available, cheap and easy to administer.
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6 Costs of integrated vector control
Paying for it
Controlling trypanosomosis has costs which are often considerably 
greater than the cash costs of control inputs as measured in most ﬁnancial
assessments of vector control projects. Full opportunity costs, or costs
of exchange, include not only price of the control inputs but also the 
transaction costs of obtaining these.17 While price is relatively easy to 
determine, deﬁning transaction costs is much more elusive. Furthermore, 
unlike input prices which tend to be constant over contiguous areas, 
transaction costs can vary widely within and between groups and
individuals, depending on location, knowledge, skills, networks, 
institutional setting and other contextual factors. They are especially
important for strategies which require the creation and maintenance
of new institutions, as is the case for community-based vector control.
Analyses based on input cost can be useful in calculating beneﬁt:cost
ratios and programme efﬁciency, but for the evaluation of long-term viability and adoption, transaction costs 
must also be considered.
Price of control inputs
The ﬁve strategies used for controlling trypanosomosis vary greatly in costs. Moreover, some strategies have 
multiple objectives, for example, sprays are used for tick control, making it difﬁcult to estimate how much of 
the cost should be billed to trypanosomosis management.
Trypanotolerant cattle: Trypanotolerant cattle cost less than trypanosusceptible cattle. In the project villages,
a pure trypanotolerant ox can cost as little as USD 150 and a pure Zebu as much as USD 300, although the 
average difference is less; more detailed studies have found on average the price of trypanotolerant cattle 
to be 20–30% less than that of a Zebu of similar condition.18 Trypanotolerant cattle are never bought as a 
deliberate strategy of control; however, trypanosomosis-control considerations can inﬂuence the choice
of breed. In the KAP study, 97% of farmers had Métis or Baoulé but only 65% of farmers said they kept 
trypanotolerant cattle as a deliberate strategy of trypanosomosis management. For livestock-rich farmers 
whose herds generally contain breeding stock, having some trypanotolerant animals can change the breed 
proﬁle of their herds without having to buy-in animals.
Decreasing susceptibility to infection: Farmers can decrease exposure to infection by avoiding high-risk
areas; increasing the nutrition and general health of their cattle will also decrease the severity of disease.
Cash costs of these strategies are difﬁcult to estimate. For a nutritional supplementation strategy, an ongoing
household study by the project suggests that costs are three to four times that spent on trypanosomosis
control. Salt is the major purchased nutritional input and acaricides, wormers and antibiotics the main
veterinary products. Again, only a small, and hard to attribute, fraction of this expense can be assigned to 
trypanosomosis control.
Medicines: DIM, which is the most widely-used trypanocide, costs from FCFA 200 to 500 (USD 0.40–1.00) 
per dose depending on brand and source, and ISMM from FCFA 400 to 800 (USD 0.80–1.60). Farmers 
estimated that they spend on average USD 41 annually for trypanosomosis control for their herd before the 
project (USD 16 for livestock-poor and USD 150 for livestock-rich); after the interventions of vector control
and training in RDU, this decreased to USD 24.
Animal baits: Using the minimalist approach to vector control, cattle received four additional treatments
with insecticide per year. These treatments were given at times when ticks were not a problem, and so had 
no effect on tick control, hence all the cost of spraying can be assigned to tsetse control. (Spraying animals at 
times during the tick season is left out of this analysis, resulting in an underestimation of the costs of control.)
The weighted average cost for additional treatments is USD 4.25 (USD 18 for rich farmers, USD 1.5 for poor).
Transaction costs include
the costs of creating,
maintaining, using and
changing institutions and
organizations. Applied to the 
transfer of property rights and
establishment or transfer of 
contract rights, they include
the costs of information,
negotiation, monitoring and
enforcement.17
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Screens: Low-cost screens using cheap material were used. These cost USD 2 each and 50 to 70 were placed 
in each village; we assume that 10% of screens need replacement each year. Screens were treated once per 
year with insecticide and left in place for six months. Insecticide costs USD 18 per litre—1 litre can treat 20–
25 screens. So, the cost of screens plus initial impregnation is USD 4 per farmer. In fact the project met the 
start-up costs of control (purchase of screens and initial impregnation) and the cost to the farmer was USD 1. 
Transaction costs of control inputs
A transaction cost common to all control strategies is the cost of acquiring information about the strategy 
and learning to apply it. This is higher for new and technically complex strategies (animal baits and screens)
than for widely-used strategies (medicines, trypanotolerant breeds). Costs will be less for strategies that are 
consonant with belief systems (treating cattle to protect them) than for strategies that are incongruent with
existing beliefs (treating cattle to kill ﬂies). Strategies which require input purchase (trypanotolerant cattle, 
improving nutrition/health, medicines, animal baits and screens) have transaction costs associated with
obtaining and transporting these inputs. (These vary considerably, even for the same strategy, for example, 
oxytetracycline capsules are available in every village and have little bulk, so the transaction costs of 
obtaining and using these are low, whereas insecticides for treating cattle and screens are only available in
large conurbations, are more bulky and difﬁcult to transport, and more laborious and dangerous to apply.)
 In addition to generic transaction costs, speciﬁc strategies have unique costs:
Medicines cannot legally be sold without a prescription or administered by farmers. Illegality of the 
transaction results not only in higher prices, but also in additional difﬁculties in obtaining medicines and
the information on how to use them.
Treating cattle with insecticides is only effective if the majority of farmers treat animals, and if treatments
are synchronized. This requires building and maintaining community organizations, which can schedule 
spraying and monitor and enforce compliance.
Screens are a local public good which are enjoyed and provided by the community at large. Provision
of screens also requires building and maintaining community organizations. In this case, they must not
only organize and monitor activities, but also collect, spend and account for the money of farmers who 
contribute—often even more problematic.
Rigorous methodologies for assessing the transaction costs of trypanosomosis control are lacking. Distance
from markets has been used as a proxy for transaction costs of obtaining inputs,19 but is not entirely
satisfactory as veterinary inputs have low-volume and low-bulk and farmers rarely make special journeys to 
buy products, instead purchasing them when their other business brings them to towns. The entire cost of the 
journey therefore cannot be assigned to the purchase of veterinary medicines.
Time spent in seeking information, in negotiating, monitoring and enforcing communal vector-control
agreements, and in carrying out community activities is also a transaction cost. These activities required on
average 7.5 days for livestock-rich farmers and 4.5 days for livestock-poor farmers.
An idea of the cost of establishing and maintaining community institutions can be inferred from the social
pressure needed to enforce participation in community structures. Community-based vector control is
a public good; for the individual the most proﬁtable action is to ‘free-ride’ and enjoy beneﬁts without
contributing to its costs. We found that ensuring payments required large amounts of social pressure and
well-developed social networks, through which this pressure can be applied. A combination of persuasion,
threats, shame-based sanctions and seizure of property was used to enforce contributions. The effort and
unpleasantness associated with this are considerable, but difﬁcult to quantify (Box 5). (This also shows the 
need for local ownership of vector-control; it would be difﬁcult, and perhaps unethical, for external agents to 
use these force majeur methods to extract payments from poor farmers.)
•
•
•
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These transaction costs are qualitatively summarized in Table 13. 
Table 13. Transactions costs associated with trypanosomosis control, by strategy 
Strategy Availability of information
Distance to obtain
inputs
Need for community
institutions
Social effort 
needed
Trypanotolerance In village Low No None
Reduce susceptibility In village Low No None
Medicines Some in village, some only
from experts
Medium No None
Animal baits Remote experts High Yes Some
Screens Remote experts High Yes High
As mentioned above, quantitative values are difﬁcult to assign and will vary between villages and individuals.
For obtaining inputs, the price of public transport to the large towns is indicative of transaction costs and,
for time spent in control activities, the cost of a day’s labour is a proxy. The former varies from USD 2–3, 
depending on the village, and the latter from USD 1–2. 
Opportunity costs of control
Full opportunity costs of control (consisting of prices of inputs and transaction costs of obtaining and
delivering them) were not directly assessed by farmers in the participatory evaluation. Instead a qualitative 
assessment was carried out in which the efﬁcacy, ease of use and affordability of different strategies were 
ranked. ‘Ease of use’ is taken as a global and unitary proxy for transaction costs as perceived by farmers. 
Chart 1 shows how farmers ranked the strategies. A rank of 1 indicates the highest rating and 6 the lowest. 
For example screens are seen as the most effective strategy, the easiest and cheapest is the use of curative 
trypanocides.
It can be seen that strategies which are easy to use (low transaction costs) are also low cost (low price). This
combination is very attractive to farmers and likely to result in their continuing use even if efﬁcacy ratings
are less attractive. Transaction costs do not necessarily parallel prices, and the high correlation between
ease of use and low cost may be biased by the method of payment. For example, farmers ranked screens
as more expensive than sprays, whereas in fact screens are slightly less expensive than sprays (USD 0.25 
less expensive). However, screens are paid for communally and pressure had to be placed on farmers to 
contribute for screens, while sprays are paid for individually and payments are voluntary, this may have 
resulted in sprays being perceived as cheaper.
Low cost and ease of use were inversely related to efﬁcacy; remember that farmers had already indicated in
their choice of strategy that affordability and not efﬁcacy was their over-riding concern, suggesting that the 
low-price, low-transaction cost control strategies such as drug use, are the most attractive to farmers. 
Box 5: Social efforts needed to ensure participation in paying for vector control
In one village, the head man issued a ﬁat ‘If you do not pay, you do not continue to live in this 
village’.
In another village, the community group responsible for control seized the chickens and goats of 
defaulters, who had to pay before getting them back.
In two villages, someone was appointed to go around ‘reminding’ defaulters of payments due.
In another village, the head shamed farmers into contributing, saying ‘If you do not pay, I will pay 
myself the amount. How can I tell her (the project organizer), the next time she comes here, that 
the people of Sokouraba refused to pay, and there will be no more project interventions.’ 
•
•
•
•
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Chart 1: Ranking of trypanosomosis control strategies by farmers (1 is the highest).
Trypanotolerant Efficacy
ISMM
0
Avoid fly areas
DIMScreens
Sprays
Easy
Low cost
6
5
4
3
2
1
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7 Beneﬁts of integrated trypanosomosis control
Valuing beneﬁts
Farmers are currently managing trypanosomosis, mainly through the use of drugs and trypanotolerant
animals, and, assuming rationality, the perceived beneﬁts must be greater than the perceived costs. Farmers 
report that they spent on average USD 41 for medicines annually (USD 16 for livestock-poor and USD 150 
for livestock-rich). The perceived costs of the strategy of trypanotolerant cattle are more difﬁcult to estimate,
but may be equated to the income foregone by not using more productive and proﬁtable trypanosusceptible
cattle. While many studies on comparative production exist, a simpler indicator of farmer perception of this
cost is the higher market price of trypanosusceptible over the Métis that farmers currently use, found to be 
15% in the study by Kamuanga et al. cited above. Combining costs for medicines and foregone income from 
using trypanotolerant cattle suggests current control is probably costing farmers several hundred dollars per 
year. Integrating existing control with new strategies (in this case, vector control) has additional costs but 
is also expected to deliver additional beneﬁts, and if the latter are greater than the former, rational farmers 
should adopt and continue with the innovations.
To ﬁnd out how farmers valued these additional beneﬁts we used an iterative methodology based on
contingent valuation techniques. Emphasis was placed on detailed participatory analysis of actual beneﬁts
and a ‘bidding’ procedure was used for assigning perceived value. Individual questionnaires are usually 
used for contingent valuation (CV). However, responses to individual questionnaires rarely follow a normal
distribution requiring complex statistical analysis, and the presence of outlier results can make interpretation
difﬁcult. By using group analysis we avoided these problems, as the discussion process allowed a consensus
measure to be chosen (not necessarily the average) and extreme values were rejected. A disadvantage of 
group methods is the risk of ‘group-think’ bias and less statistical power.
Perception of beneﬁt: During the planning workshop a year earlier, farmers had identiﬁed and ranked the 
potential beneﬁts of control in order of how important they considered them (column 2 in Table 14). The 
results of that exercise were used as the starting point for evaluating the beneﬁts of community-based vector 
control actually perceived by the farmers to date. Farmers revisited the anticipated beneﬁts of control to see 
which were detectable. In Table 14, the beneﬁts perceived by the different groups in the four villages were 
evaluated and listed in order of perceived importance by the farmers; each village is represented by a tick 
or a cross. (In one village, Mbie, all the participants were categorized as livestock-poor and there were no
separate groups of livestock-rich or opinion leaders.)
Table 14. Perception of beneﬁts (1 = most important)
Beneﬁt Importance Livestock-rich Livestock-poor Opinion leaders
More draft power 1 33X 3333 333
Less biting insects 2 333 3333 333
More manure 3 333 333X XX3
Less expense for medicines 4 333 3333 333
Less deaths 5 333 3333 333
More births 6 333 XXXX 33X
More cattle sold 7 333 XXXX XXX
More milk 8  XXXX XX
Note: A tick indicates that the group collectively agreed that they had observed this beneﬁt after vector control, a cross indicates that 
the beneﬁt was not noticed, a box that no assessment was made. Each column of marks corresponds to the assessment for one village.
Farmers found this analysis easy; they reported that they had noticed improvements in most of the areas. The 
types of beneﬁts noticed were similar to the ﬁndings of the review of previous projects in Burkina Faso (see 
working paper 2 in this series) and to other studies on the beneﬁts of trypanosomosis control. Livestock-rich 
farmers were most likely to notice improvements, probably because they have the most animals. Opinion
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leaders are not directly involved in looking after animals and were less likely to notice changes. Livestock-
poor farmers often do not keep cows and therefore did not observe changes in milk production or births.
Other beneﬁts noticed by some groups were:
Increased price of animals sold because they are in better condition
The cattle are calmer and easier to look after; so the herder has less ﬁnes to pay for straying animals
Animals work harder, so less days are needed to cultivate the same area
Better human health.
Quantifying beneﬁts: Farmers were then asked to estimate the typical differences in animal health and
production resulting from vector control (Table 15). Farmers used the year before control as the reference
point. Some parameters were difﬁcult to estimate, and there was a tendency to remember the exceptional
cases (availability bias). For example, one farmer said that the year before the vector control he lost ﬁve 
animals and this year he lost none, but on further discussion it emerged that most farmers had lost one or two 
animals, some none. Farmers found it easy to estimate differences in ﬂies, medicine expenditure and deaths. 
Estimating additional days of draft power and manure was more difﬁcult.
Table 15. Quantiﬁcation of beneﬁts of vector control perceived by farmers
Beneﬁt Livestock-poor Livestock-rich
Fewer biting insects 70% reduction in ﬂies 70% reduction
More days draft 15.25 extra days draft per household 6 extra days
Less expense on medicine FCFA 3125 less spent on drugs per herd FCFA 32,500 less on drugs
More milk 0 1.23 litres more milk per herd (0–5)
Fewer deaths 0.4 fewer deaths per herd 2 less deaths (0–4)
More births 0 2 more births per herd (0–3)
More manure 0.13 more wheelbarrows per herd 2.5 more cartloads of manure
Fewer episodes of disease are not directly translated into more days of draft production. In some cases, 
farmers do not have the other factors of production needed to take advantage of more healthy cattle (land,
labour, money for inputs) and better animal health will not result in more days of draft. (In one village, a 
group reported that cattle worked less days after the intervention as the cattle were in better health and so 
work which would have taken six days to complete was now done in four or ﬁve days.) Livestock-rich farmers 
have a surplus of cattle and so better animal health was less likely to result in more days worked than was 
the case for livestock-poor farmers. Yet, in general and on average, less disease resulted in more days of draft 
power—12 extra days for livestock-poor farmers and 6 extra days for livestock-rich farmers.
All farmers reported that they spent less money on treatments after vector control. Yet, farmers continue to 
spend relatively large sums on medicines. This supports the ﬁnding in the analysis of farmer integration of 
control strategies, that vector control is only a partial substitute for use of trypanocides. While most studies
show that expenditure on trypanocidal drugs decreases after vector control, some report unchanged or even
increased expenditure.
Table 16. Expenditure on trypanosomosis treatments per household before and after control
Before control
(USD)
After control
(USD)
Livestock-rich 150 90
Livestock-poor 16 9
Only livestock-rich farmers keep cows and they noticed an increase in production per herd of around 1.25 
litres of milk a day. As farmers have 5–20 cows giving milk at any one time, this corresponds to a small 
increase of around a tenth of a litre per cow. Beneﬁts this small are unlikely to be marketed, and farmers 
•
•
•
•
25
reported that control did not result in much increase in income. Likewise, only livestock-rich farmers noticed
increases in birth rate. Typically livestock-poor farmers did not notice a change in mortality, but for livestock-
rich farmers with many animals, this was detectable.
Changes in manure production were difﬁcult to estimate. Where noticed, these were the result of fewer 
deaths and hence more animals producing manure rather than increased production per cow.
Assigning price and value of control: Farmers were next asked to give an overall estimate of the value 
of additional control, corresponding to what they would be willing to pay for control. Estimations varied
between USD 10 and USD 20 per year, with USD 9.8 as the consensus amount. This value is similar to that 
obtained by CV using individual questionnaires obtained by Kamuanga et al. in Burkina Faso, i.e. FCFA 5112 
(USD 10.22) on average and FCFA 6756 (USD 13.51) for those willing to contribute both money and labour 
to control), but is much less than the value obtained by taking the market prices of the beneﬁts obtained.
In the previous chapter, we suggested that the failure to take account of transaction costs results in an under-
estimation of the costs of trypanosomosis control; this chapter argues that the beneﬁts of trypanosomosis
control have also been over-estimated. This was also a ﬁnding of the planning workshop (described in
working paper 3 in this series), which indicated that the market price did not represent farmers’ perception of 
the anticipated beneﬁts which they would obtain from control.
Possible reasons for this include:
Farmers cannot easily calculate the contribution of trypanosomosis control to improved crop production
and enhanced income.
Beneﬁts from trypanosomosis control may not be converted to cash because other inputs are lacking. For 
example, cattle are often not the limiting factor for production, and so additional days of availability for 
work will not necessarily translate into additional crop production.
There is uncertainty over obtaining the beneﬁts of control, as none of the strategies are completely 
effective. (On average, farmers spend less on trypanocides as a result of vector control, but disease is
never completely predictable, and some may spend more.)
The transaction costs of marketing the beneﬁts of control may be discouragingly high, especially when
beneﬁts are produced irregularly or in small amounts (e.g. additional milk and manure).
Markets for the beneﬁts may not exist (additional calves) or may not function well because of entry
barriers, asymmetries of information, or other factors.20
There may be inelastic demand for the beneﬁts of control. For example, nearly all farmers plan for the 
cultivation season and either have their own cattle or arrangements for using draft cattle. If farmers have 
additional days of traction as a result of vector control, they will not be able to easily market them.
•
•
•
•
•
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Box 6: Farmer perceived beneﬁts of trypanosomosis control
An example of photographc cards used to facilitate ranking in particpatory assessements
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8 Weighing costs and beneﬁts
Theory and practice
Trypanosomosis control has costs and beneﬁts, and economic theory predicts that when beneﬁts to an
individual exceed the costs incurred, rational farmers will choose to adopt and continue with control.
However, while ﬁnancial beneﬁt:cost analyses of vector control have been almost uniformly positive, 
and nearly all the beneﬁts accrue to those carrying out control, the long-term viability and spontaneous
adoption of vector control is almost uniformly absent. Most beneﬁt:cost analyses of control do not take 
into consideration transaction costs of control or the fact that farmer perception of beneﬁts may differ
from that suggested by analysis of market prices, and our analysis suggests that both of these are important
considerations. In this chapter, we present three analyses of the vector-control strategy innovated by the 
project: a simpliﬁed beneﬁt:cost analysis using market prices for beneﬁts and inputs which farmers would 
gain and pay for assuming spontaneous adoption of the control strategies without a project intervention (a 
‘without-project scenario’); a beneﬁt:cost analysis including actual costs of the project; and ﬁnally an analysis
incorporating transaction costs and farmer perception.
Conventional cost–beneﬁt assessment
Conventional beneﬁt:cost analysis typically uses partial budgeting to compare costs of additional control
(including revenue foregone) to the value of extra herd output plus costs saved. Costs and beneﬁts are usually 
based on current market prices, although shadow prices may be used when markets are believed to be 
distorted or missing. Applying this to community-based vector control gives the values presented in Table 17 
for the beneﬁts of control.
Table 17. Value of beneﬁts of integrated vector control per household per season
Livestock-
poor
Livestock-
rich
Weighted
average Unit
Market price per 
unit
Market value per 
household
More days draft 15 6 12.5 Days 1000 12,480
Less expense on
medicine 3125 32,500 8706 FCFA 8706 8706
More milk 0 1.23 0.23 Litres 125 350
Fewer deaths 0.4 2 0.70 Animals 50,000 35,200
More births 0 2 0.38 Animals 12,000 4560
More manure 1 2.5 1.29 Cart load 2000 570
Using this technique, the beneﬁts of control are estimated as FCFA 63,387 per farmer or a total of USD 
27,462 for the four villages. (N.B. farmers may have overestimated the quantity of beneﬁts and more 
objective information on beneﬁts is also being collected through epidemiological/animal production surveys, 
but is not yet available.)
The costs of additional control are as set out in chapter 6, and summarized in Table 18. These are the costs 
which farmers would have to meet to continue carrying out control in the absence of a project. The cost of 
farmer training is not included, as this would not be available to farmers in the absence of a project.
Discounting is not used as the stream of beneﬁts and costs are calculated only for the 12-month duration
of the project. For similar reasons, a dynamic model of impacts incorporating increases in herd size is not
applied.
These estimates provide a beneﬁt:cost ratio of 7:1, similar to the results of other beneﬁt:cost studies for 
trypanosomosis control (typically in the 5:1 to 2:1 range).21 Simple sensitivity analysis indicates these ratios
are fairly robust to likely changes in input prices and somewhat less so to changes in the amount of beneﬁts
obtained.22
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Table 18. Additional costs of integrated vector control per season (FCFA)
Livestock-rich Livestock-poor Weighted average
Sprays (FCFA) 9000 720 2293
Pay for new screens (FCFA) 1079 1079 1079
Impregnation of screens (FCFA) 485 485 485
Upkeep and repair of screens (FCFA) 110 110 110
Labour (days × average wage FCFA) 7.5 × 1000 4.5 × 1000 5.7 × 1000
Total 18,174 6894 9037
Beneﬁt:cost including project costs
The project adopted a participatory approach which is relatively intensive in time and resources. The costs for 
the nine months of active intervention by the project are estimated as shown in Table 19 (full cost data were 
not yet available at the time of writing).
Table 19: Project costs of community-based vector control (USD)
Activity Cost
Scoping visits 350
Initial diagnostic PRA 450
Farmer study visits 1093
Participatory planning 350
Support to farmer implementation 1633
Training in Rational Drug Use 973
Participatory evaluation 350
Management (0.75 of which was for 
participatory process)
2000
Total 7199
As shown in Table 19, the overall cost of implementation was USD 7199 or USD 33 per farmer-household 
involved in the project. Participatory activities accounted for USD 3743 or 52% of the total costs. (The much 
greater costs of epidemiological and entomological surveys that were carried out at the same sites during
the project—around USD 15,000, or USD 70 per household—are not included in this costing as these were 
research activities not necessary for implementation.) If farmers had to pay for these costs, vector control
would always result in a net loss—the implication is that external support would, at least in this case, be 
needed for community vector control. The beneﬁt:cost ratio of direct project implementation costs (but as is
standard, omitting project indirect costs) is 1:2.4. 
Beneﬁt:cost including transaction costs and using perceived beneﬁts
Farmers perceive the beneﬁts of control as less than suggested by market prices, and must pay not only the 
prices of inputs, but also the transaction costs of acquiring and applying these. When this is factored into
the analysis based on the estimates generated by the participatory evaluation exercise, the attractiveness of 
control to farmers becomes very precarious.
Farmers value their annual beneﬁts of additional control as worth USD 9.81 to them individually, and as 
the price of control inputs (not including training) was USD 8.25, it is obvious that control will only be 
attractive if transaction costs of delivering it are negligible or if the costs of control are met by external
agents. Unfortunately, transaction costs seem to be considerable; just taking into account the costs most 
easy to quantify (transport and time spent in control), suggests costs on the magnitude of USD 2–4; the 
1. A similar exercise had been carried out during the planning workshop, before the start of control. At that time, farmers assigned a 
value of USD 8/farmer per year for the beneﬁts they hoped to achieve from control.
2
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costs of establishing, maintaining and using the village institutions that deliver vector control, and the 
costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance with control, are certain to be greater. If all transaction
costs are factored in, it is possible that engaging in community vector control would result in a net loss 
for participating farmers. In this case, the project met the start-up costs of control, making control more 
attractive to farmers—the amount in cash actually paid by farmers was USD 3.25 and so net beneﬁts were 
proportionately higher.
Costs and beneﬁts are both higher for livestock-rich farmers, but as beneﬁts are relatively higher than costs, 
vector control is more attractive for livestock-rich than for livestock-poor (this is reﬂected in their higher level 
of participation, see chapter 3). Screens are less expensive than sprays, especially if projects meet start-up 
costs, although farmers perceive them as being more expensive.
It can be seen that the value assigned to beneﬁts using conventional beneﬁt:cost analysis with market prices
for inputs and beneﬁts is much higher than that obtained using opportunity costs and farmer perceptions—
this divergence throws light on the ﬁnding that although economic analyses of vector control have 
consistently estimated positive beneﬁt:cost ratios, farmers consistently refuse to meet the costs of control or to 
spontaneously adopt it.
But it is also apparent that from the point of view of governments or development agents, vector control is an
attractive rural development strategy, representing high returns on money invested. Unfortunately, developing
country governments seldom have the luxury of paying for all development interventions where beneﬁts
exceed costs, and development expenditure decisions are usually based on other criteria than beneﬁt:cost
analysis.
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9 Emerging institutions
Northern solutions for southern problems
Participatory trypanosomosis projects usually introduce new institutions with the objective of delivering long-
term control, and in Burkina Faso as is common in Francophone Africa, this has been the default option.
Farmer associations are formed along standardized and formulaic lines (e.g. a management committee of 
ﬁve and a body of members who are supposed to attend regular meetings and make regular contributions
to a communal fund).23 Associations meeting these criteria can be registered with the government. This is an
entirely exogenous model of animal health management and it is perhaps not surprising that it has not always 
worked well in the African context. Associations for animal health seem to be particularly problematic;
problems arise even when external support is provided, and in the absence of external support, most 
associations collapse or turn into private-good institutions.
Because of these problems with ‘standard model’ associations in the context of animal health development,
the project decided to avoid a pre-deﬁned model and instead encourage each village to use a system, either
new or existing, which they thought would work best for them. The project advised them to avoid certain
institutions which are notoriously failure-prone, such as credit, systems requiring regular collection of small 
amounts of money, committee management of other people’s money, unallocated responsibilities and the 
running of businesses by large and heterogeneous groups. In practice, the institutions used for vector-control
delivery in the project reﬂected an eclectic mix of the institutions available, with considerable variation
between villages. These institutions were:
Traditional institutions:
Chef du village: A hereditary position, the chef is often the descendent of the founder of the village. He 
is the supreme decision maker within the village and will be responsible, for example, for authorizing
a project to work in the village, setting of infrastructure and communal activities such as road repair. 
•
Box 7: Problems with animal health associations
When the project is ﬁnished, all is ﬁnished.
The project trained over 200 community animal health workers linked to livestock associations. Two 
years later, no one knows what has happened to them. They have just disappeared into the bush.
There are always problems with management of funds.
Only a few people are active in the association—they carry out activities for their own beneﬁt and
not for the beneﬁt of the association.
Managing group money is not easy. When there are problems, you go back and discuss and try 
again. It takes a long-term commitment—10, 15 years to make an association work.
People take the medicine from the livestock association and do not pay.
The animal health instruments given to the association belong to everyone and are not used properly.
Managing sales and ﬁlling in books are very difﬁcult for illiterate people. You need a lot of patience,
a lot of time, and you have to keep coming back and helping them to do it properly.
People do not feel conﬁdent about giving money to the livestock association; they do not trust them 
to use it to replenish the communal funds.
(Representative comments from interviews with state veterinary ofﬁcers, community animal health 
workers, and NGO/project staff).24
•
•
•
•
•
•
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The village head usually has a council comprising the older men in the village, and decisions are made 
after consultation with these (gerontocracy). Larger villages are divided into districts, each with a head 
responsible for decision making.
Chef du terroir: Also a hereditary position, the chef du terroir is responsible for the allocation of ﬁelds 
for cultivation. He takes charge of ritual and cultural events and with the punishment of those who 
transgress the cultural rules and norms. Numerous taboos exist in the villages, for example, some days 
are considered auspicious and others inauspicious, ritual offerings are made in sacred sites, some types of 
cultivation are forbidden to some groups, some areas are forbidden to some groups, some types of wood 
cannot be used and some types of food cannot be eaten by some or all groups.
Interest group associations: Relatives, friends, neighbours or age-groups may associate informally for 
mutual assistance (including tontines and joint labour) and for celebration. There are separate groups for 
men, women and youths (in many villages, hunters’ associations play an important role). Groups may 
be based on relationship, common interests or common objectives. For example, in one village there 
is an informal group of rich livestock keepers who clubbed together to buy cattle in order to reduce the 
transaction costs.
State institutions:
Delegate: Appointed by the state and under the prefect, the delegate is the representative of the 
government administration at the village level. A process of decentralization is underway in Burkina Faso 
and it is envisaged that the current system of state-appointed administrators will be replaced by locally 
elected councils.
Development institutions:
Farmers associations: Development and/or parastatal actors have established groups in all villages. The 
most active are those of the cotton parastatal, SOFITEX, and most farmers with livestock are members. 
Associations comprise a management committee (president, vice president, treasurer, assistant treasurer 
and secretary) and members. Associations ﬁtting government-established criteria can be registered. In
large villages, there may be more than one group. Previous projects have established associations of 
livestock keepers but these are in general not active. A rapid appraisal carried out by the project showed 
that livestock keepers associations suffered from the usual problems: low participation, lack of literacy 
rendering accounts non-transparent, lack of individual incentives to motivate participation.
Expertise-based institutions:
Vaccinators have been trained by previous projects in most of the villages, and are active in Mbie and
Kotoura. The project organized a study tour at the start of activities and a group of six farmers from each 
village attended. These participants were selected by the villagers using criteria agreed with the project. 
In addition, training was given to six farmers per village in Rational Drug Use. These groups of farmers in
all cases played an important role in community vector control.
Leadership—primary and secondary actors
In all villages, decision making was devolved to a small group by a process of consensus following from 
discussions (and in no case formal voting or elections). For some personalities, the exercise of authority is its
own reward, and in all cases those who undertook the responsibility for decision-making were community
leaders. This both legitimized and enhanced their additional role in vector control. In all cases, one person
had ultimate decision making powers, but the actor varied from village to village:
Kotoura   Vaccinator and owner of a large herd
Mbie  Delegate, owner of a medium-sized herd
•
•
•
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Sokoroine  Owner of a large herd and the head of a small informal group of livestock-   
   rich farmers
Sokouraba  Village head-man
Although there was always one actor who took overall responsibility, other actors were also involved to 
varying degrees as shown in Table 20 (actor with overall responsibility in italics, 0 = no involvement to ++++ 
= maximum involvement).
Table 20. Perceived involvement of actors in the delivery of community-based vector control
Mbie Sokouraba Sokoroine Kotoura
Village head-man 0* + + + + 0
Chief of land allocation 0* + 0 0
Head of village sub-divisions 0 + + + 0
Administrative ofﬁcer + + + + 0 0 0
Farmers trained by project + + + + + + + + + + 
Lead farmers + + + + + + + +
Vaccinator + + 0 0 + + + +
Livestock association 0 0 + + +
Cotton association + 0 0 0
*In Mbie, the same person is chef du village and chef du terrain.
As well as institutions for decision-making, mechanisms are needed to communicate decisions to those 
affected. The task of communicating decisions is less obviously self-rewarding than that of leadership. This
seems to be recognized in the fact that in all cases, villagers chose to allocate the bicycle provided by the 
project to the person given the role of informing other farmers. In two villages, this person belonged to the 
decision-making group, but in two villages other people were chosen who were considered to be naturally 
good at communicating and informing.
The formation of institutions was sometimes contested. Complex local politics exist in all villages and
in some there were particular issues in transfer of power between age groups. In one village, the elders 
criticized the ‘group of young men and their friends’ who were involved in vector control and proposed 
instead a formal group consisting of president, secretaries etc. of which they would take charge, and this
despite the fact that all formal groups for livestock development had failed in this village. Participatory
processes often result in changes of the status quo and this can be threatening and divisive. Providing training
was a useful and non-provocative way of positively inﬂuencing the ‘balance of power’. By giving people 
new knowledge and competencies, training increased the entitlement of active and progressive farmers to a 
greater say in decision-making.
Institutional constraints and community approaches
Several analyses of community-based vector control have suggested that the problem of free riders is a 
fundamental, and perhaps insurmountable, constraint to adoption and long-term viability. Provision of 
vector control is a public good (difﬁcult exclusion and low subtractability) which will be under-provided
by individuals; no one can be excluded from the beneﬁts of vector-control, so everyone has an incentive to 
stand back and let others provide it. However, vector control with baits is a local public good, the beneﬁts of 
which can be entirely captured by a community choosing to implement it. As such, management analogies
may be helpfully drawn from the study of Common Pool Resources (CPRs), that is, private goods for which it
is both difﬁcult to exclude individuals from use and the cost of deﬁning individual rights is prohibitive.25 CPRs
have high subtractability and because excludability is low, rational individuals have incentives to over-exploit
(keep adding cows to the common) resulting in degradation of the resource. Vector control is not subtractable 
but it must be paid for and because excludability is low, rational individuals have incentives to under-
•
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contribute resulting in failure to provide vector control. In both cases, the higher payoffs achievable from 
co-operation can be incentives for group management. The wide literature on management of CPRs shows 
that community management can be effective and sustainable26 and it is not unreasonable to postulate that 
the similar institution of community management of vector control can also be viable. Many of the factors 
propitious to community management27 are present in the case of community vector control (see Table 21). 
We divide these into three categories: incentives that encourage participation, facilitators for management
and disincentives that punish non-participation.
Table 21. Factors favouring joint management and their relevance to community vector control
Factors encouraging joint management Community vector control
Facilitating management Small and clearly deﬁned resource Yes
Close physical proximity between resource and users Yes
Small and deﬁned group of users Sometimes
Rules for decision-making, fund-raising and activities Yes
Discouraging ‘free-riders’ Easy identiﬁcation of free riders Yes
Sanctions for non compliance Yes
Capacity to exclude from beneﬁts No
Encouraging participation High dependence on the resource of controlling tsetse 
with animal or stationary baits (sprays or screens)
No
Disincentives to punish non-participation
Disincentives for non-compliance in community-managed processes often take the form of social sanctions.
In all villages, mechanisms were instituted to allow this; typically payment for control was made a public
activity, and contributions and defalcations were publicly noted and sometimes recorded. In all villages,
traditional leaders and authorities were involved in the vector-control interventions, which added social
importance to the payment. In some villages, these mechanisms were strengthened by additional measures 
(see chapter 6). African rural communities are ‘face cultures’ and where external shame results from 
deviation, higher levels of co-operation are expected. Individuals respond to anticipated shame-based 
sanctions in the same way as they respond to pecuniary sanctions; they choose a level of co-operation that 
equates the marginal expected loss in utility due to feeling external shame with the marginal loss in utility
due to co-operating.28
Treating screens with insecticide is a pure public good, non-rival and non excludable; on the other 
hand, spraying cattle with insecticide is a mixed good as there are private beneﬁts as well as public-good
beneﬁts. This is generally seen as an advantage, but in terms of community-based vector control, it has the 
disadvantage of moving the activity into the private arena. No sanctions were applied if farmers chose not to 
spray their cattle and it was also much harder to observe compliance. We found that community participation
in cattle-spraying was lower than that in screen-placing.
Factors that facilitate management
Management is easier when resources are clearly deﬁned and easy to monitor. This is the case for the 
screens providing tsetse control as relatively small numbers are placed in public areas at limited and
deﬁned intervals. The vector control activity of spraying cattle is more difﬁcult to deﬁne and monitor, and as 
mentioned above we found that community participation in this activity was lower than in use of screens.
Management may be easier when groups are small, however it is also argued that, because group size affects 
several important variables in different ways (transaction costs, share of beneﬁts received, control costs), it
is not possible to propose general predictions on the effects of group size. We found no relation between
group size and participation. Social homogeneity has been suggested to facilitate management. Theoretically, 
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the greater ability of the livestock-rich to internalize beneﬁts will increase their willingness to co-operate in
the provision of vector control and at the same time diminish the already small propensity of the livestock-
poor to invest. Our project conﬁrmed this hypothesis: participation in the provision of vector control was 
considerably higher for livestock-rich farmers (for example participation at the evaluation for the livestock-
poor was 23%, and for the livestock-rich was 72%, difference highly signiﬁcant (p > 0.001) binomial test).
Where institutions already exist or villagers have skill and experience in group activities, management of 
resources and activities is facilitated. In all villages there is experience in communal management and
participation, although some villages have greater capacity than others (Mbie and Sokoroni scoring highly
in this respect and Sokouraba and Kotoura lower). Villagers also showed creativity and ﬂexibility in creating
rules, for example, in Sokoroine, the inequity in distribution of beneﬁts was resolved by using a headage 
payment for control so that farmers with more cattle paid more. However, this solution was not followed 
in other villages, where it was argued that a headage payment would result in some farmers having to pay 
amounts so large that they would violate the ‘fairness’ norm and would cause these farmers to withdraw 
participation to the detriment to all. A sliding scale of payment would be a possible solution, but this was not
adopted by the villages, perhaps because of the complexity of calculations.
Incentives encouraging participation
Importance of a common pool resource is a crucial factor in encouraging group management and perhaps 
the greatest threat to the effective community management of vector control is the lack of incentives to 
come together to provide group vector control. Farmers are not critically dependent on vector control.
They live with trypanosomosis and although losses occur, these are not at levels where the farm enterprise
is threatened. Furthermore, farmers have other options for trypanosomosis control such as use of 
trypanotolerant cattle, risk avoidance and use of medicines. These are private goods with much lower 
externalities so farmers can internalize more of the beneﬁts. They are provided by individuals avoiding the 
transaction costs associated with group action, and so are easier to implement than group vector control.
In addition the beneﬁts of vector control perceived by farmers are relatively low compared to the costs— 
representing a signiﬁcant disincentive for participation.
Prevention may be better than cure, but it is much harder to sell to poor farmers. Vector control is an
insurance measure to reduce losses and the uptake of insurance by resource-constrained peasants is
notoriously problematic. It is much easier to get farmers to pay for cure than prevention. (It is perhaps not
irrelevant that the global market for human drugs that treat disease is USD 300 billion, while the global 
market for vaccines (preventative drugs) is USD 5 billion, and analyses based on New Institutional Economics
have investigated the underlying factors that make people more willing to pay for cure than prevention, even
when this is the least cost-effective option.)29 Interestingly and depressingly, in none of the project villages
do farmers use bed-nets to prevent malaria, though in all villages children have died from malaria in the past 
12 months and households pay routinely for products to treat malaria. When people will not pay to prevent
a disease killing their children, it may not be realistic to assume they will pay to prevent a similar disease
affecting their animals.
We conclude that neither community capacity for management nor the public good nature of vector control
is a limiting factor for community delivery in the communities evaluated. The relatively weak incentive for 
group participation in vector control is more likely to be the critical constraint.
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10 Prospects for continued control
Long-term viability deﬁcits: Structural or process
Bait technologies for tsetse control have been in use for over 20 years and their effectiveness is proven and
impacts and costs well documented. However, while the questions of ‘Does it work?’, ‘What are the impacts?’ 
and ‘How much does it cost?’ have been answered, the questions of ‘Who will pay for it?’ and ‘Is it worth 
it?’’ remain. The answer to these latter questions will determine the role of bait techniques in the control of 
trypanosomosis. While the revealed behaviour of farmers indicates that they will not pay for it and do not
ﬁnd it worthwhile, debate continues over whether this is due to structural (intrinsic economic disincentives) 
or process factors (lack of participation). If the latter is correct, then community-vector control is a potentially
viable and sustainable institution and merely requires more attention to design and implementation. If the 
former is correct, then the pursuit of sustainability is an ignis fatuus and external support should be made 
available where community vector control is justiﬁed.
There is certainly evidence that many projects which attempted to be participatory, in practice turned out 
to be top–down and unable to generate local ownership,30 and recently success, or near-success, has been
claimed for high-level-participatory community projects in Côte d’Ivoire.31 However, the major sustainability
deﬁcits in most projects reviewed suggests that the problem goes deeper than poor participation. The main
theoretical objections to sustainability is that provision of vector control is a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ or 
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ where the good of freedom from tsetse will be inevitably undersupplied; however, 
community vector control can be conceptualized less pessimistically as a ‘Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ or a 
‘Fairness’ Game (see Box 8).
However, in practice farmers have repeated opportunities to participate in control and certain farmers 
have a high propensity for participation (are catalysts to start co-operation), so the situation is more akin
to a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In this game, a reciprocation or ‘Tit for tat’ strategy is successful. 
Each player plays the move which the previous player used; so if co-operation starts, it will be reciprocated
(and if catalysts exist, co-operation will start). The Fairness Game is another dynamic game strategy which 
recognizes the importance of the social norm of fairness; the strategy is to co-operate if, and only if, most 
other players co-operate. In this game, co-operation is the dominant strategy.
Box 8: Freedom from tsetse—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma or 
Fairness Game?
Provision of vector control has been formulated as a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In a one-shot
PD game, neither player can be sure that the other will contribute to vector control and the strategy 
of non-participation has a higher payoff than the strategy of contributing (see pay-off matrix below). 
Non-participation is rational from the individual’s point of view, but irrational from the point of view of 
society.
Payoff matrix for vector control
Note: we assume 2 players, the beneﬁts of control
are USD 10 to each player if both contribute,
if only one contributes the beneﬁts decrease to 
USD 7 and if neither there are no beneﬁts. The 
costs of control are USD 5. It can be seen that the 
dominant strategy is to refrain from contributing—
this is always the best strategy for the individual,
however the dominated strategy of contribution
delivers the highest overall beneﬁts of USD 20 
and pay-off of USD 10. 
x,y = Net beneﬁt for
Player 1, Player 2
Player 2 Decision
Contribute Refrain
Player 1
Decision
Contribute 5, 5 2, 7
Refrain 7, 2 0, 0
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Key constraints to adoption and long-term viability
An earlier review of participatory vector control projects in Burkina Faso (see working paper 2 in this series)
revealed three key constraints to long-term viability of participatory control, namely: 1) farmers lacked the 
technical skills to carry out control, 2) farmers could not organize the process of control, and 3) farmers 
found vector control too expensive.
The current project placed special emphasis on these aspects. The transfer of technical skills proved the 
least difﬁcult of these. However, there were challenges mainly related to the supply of inputs needed for 
control and lack of information on technical procedures. Despite many years work on just these issues,
there is no single manual or reference on how to carry out control with animal baits and screens tailored
to Burkina Faso. This information was very difﬁcult to obtain and as yet is incomplete. There were also 
problems with input supply—the product used for treating cattle came from Côte d’Ivoire and as a result of 
the disturbances there, the supply was interrupted shortly after the start of the project. The project was able to 
source alternative products in a neighbouring country, but the price was higher; this option would have been
difﬁcult for unsupported communities. The cloth used for screens was also imported and hence not readily
accessible to farmers. We have not yet been able to obtain information on locally available cloth that has 
been tested and determined to be suitable for use.
The management of control also did not present major problems, perhaps because of our decision to rely 
on local, functional institutions rather than introducing western-model institutions which have a history of 
dysfunctionality when applied to animal health in general, and vector control in particular. 
The affordability of control was the most challenging aspect. Although control is not expensive, the 
evaluation revealed that costs are high in relation to the beneﬁts perceived. As the previous two sections
set out, we found that farmers rationally place a low value on control as the result of high transaction costs 
of control, difﬁculty in measuring beneﬁts, inability to convert beneﬁts to cash and uncertainty in attaining
beneﬁts. The analysis suggests that control is affordable and that beneﬁts are higher than costs, but only just. 
However, control is not likely to represent good value for money given other calls on resources and other 
options for trypanosomosis control.
Farmer evaluation of long-term viability
During the evaluation, farmers undertook a self-assessment of both their capacity to carry out vector-control
innovations and their belief in the long-term viability of such interventions. Farmers were generally conﬁdent
of their capacity to deliver control; there were more doubts over long-term viability. Chart 2 shows the 
competence scores assigned by the different groups (livestock-rich, livestock-poor and opinion leaders) in the 
four different villages. The livestock-poor farmer groups were more likely to evaluate their capability as low, 
and among the villages Kotoura was most likely to give low capability scores.
Chart 3 gives the sustainability scores. Farmer groups showed less conﬁdence in the long-term viability of 
control than in their competence to technically carry out control, as can be seen by the greater number
of groups assigning a score of 2 (probably viable) and smaller number assigning a score of 1 (fully viable).
Again, livestock-poor farmers have least conﬁdence in viability. As discussed earlier, the beneﬁts of vector 
control reported by livestock-rich farmers were much greater than the beneﬁts perceived by livestock-poor 
farmers, and the participation of livestock-rich farmers was also higher. Although all farmers in these villages
were ‘poor’ in terms of dollar-a-day income and development levels, trypanosomosis control will beneﬁt
preferentially the less poor, as the poorest do not keep cattle. It will also beneﬁt men mostly as they have 
greater ownership and control over the resource of cattle. This potential to increase inequity at village level 
should be addressed during programme design. In this case it had been agreed at the initial meetings that 
separate training and support on poultry and small-ruminant production would be given to the women.
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(1 = fully capable, 2 = mainly capable with some problems, 3 = not capable; some scores are super-imposed
indicating the same score was given by the groups in different villages.)
Chart 2. Self-evaluation of capability of carrying out vector control by farmer groups.
(1 = fully viable, 2 = probably viable but problems exist, 3 = not viable.)
Chart 3. Self-evaluation of capability of long-term viability of control.
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As regards the different components of vector control, management was seen as least problematic, with almost 
all groups scoring the management structures as fully competent. Farmers felt they were capable of using
both screens and sprays, but had slightly more reservations over the long-term viability of these strategies.
Financing was seen to be the most problematic area. (However, it is also possible that farmers drew attention
to problems with ﬁnancing as a negotiating device in order to justify continued assistance form the project.)
Table 22. Evaluation of community-based vector control by project staff and villagers compared 
Villagers auto-evaluation
Capability Viability
Organization/management 1.08 1.30
Sprays 1.25 1.75
Screens 1.25 1.75
Financing 1.55 1.81
Note: See Charts 2 and 3 for an explanation of the scoring system.
In terms of the long-term viability of spraying, it proved difﬁcult to make a distinction between the spraying
that most farmers do during the rainy season to control ticks, and the additional spraying proposed by the 
project in the dry season to control tsetse. The former is primarily a private good, which has the externality
of vector control; the latter is a public good (with some beneﬁts to individuals). Farmers found the concept
of spraying cows to kill ﬂies much more difﬁcult than the concept of placing screens to kill ﬂies, and the 
belief that spraying worked by protecting the animal sprayed was persistent (and wrong). The presence of 
some (minor) beneﬁts for the animal treated (less disturbance ﬂies, perhaps fewer bites from tsetse resulting
in reduced risk of disease) further confounds the issue and, for farmers, the individual beneﬁts of spraying
are more salient than the collective-good beneﬁts. Hence, when farmers expressed conﬁdence in the long-
term viability of spraying, this includes both public- and private-good treatments and likely overestimates the 
viability of spraying as a means of vector control.
Villages with more experience and previous success in participation (Sokoroni, Mbie) tended to rate 
themselves more highly than villages with less experience and success (Sokouraba, Kotoura). 
Table 23. Self-evaluation of capability and sustainability, mean score by village
Project staff evaluation
Capability Viability
Sokoroni 1.20 1.20
Mbie 1.50 1.75
Kotoura 1.67 1.75
Sokouraba 1.20 1.90
Note: See Charts 2 and 3 for an explanation of the scoring system.
Project evaluation of long-term viability
Evaluation of long-term viability by the project staff was slightly more pessimistic with viability perceived as 
unlikely to be achieved in two villages and possible, although problematic, in the remaining two.
Table 24. Project staff evaluation of capability and sustainability of community-based vector control, mean score.
Capability Viability
Management 1.50 2.25
Sprays 1.50 2.00
Screens 2.00 2.50
Financing 2.00 2.00
Capability Viability
Sokoroni 1.50 2.00
Mbie 2.00 2.00
Kotoura 1.75 2.50
Sokouraba 1.75 2.25
Note: See Charts 2 and 3 for an explanation of the scoring system.
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The future of vector control
Community, and to a lesser extent project staff, assessment of viability was cautiously optimistic, and this was 
supported by revealed behaviour of farmers. In all four villages, farmers paid for, treated and placed screens
without the ﬁnancial support of the project—the ﬁrst time this has happened in Burkina Faso.
However, the relatively low perceived beneﬁts from vector control, the high transaction costs of community
vector control and the fact that farmers are not highly dependent on it do not augur well for the long-term
viability of community-based control. However, the situation is not static, major trends of the last half 
century—increasing resistance to trypanocides, increasing agricultural intensiﬁcation and decreasing pressure 
of infection—may affect farmer’s future choices. Resistance to trypanocides renders farmers’ preferred strategy 
of medicine use less effective. However, farmers are likely to continue to use medicines to reduce severity
of symptoms and meet the strong cultural imperative of treating in the face of sickness. (They may switch 
to cheaper and ineffective medicines as the efﬁcacy advantage of ISMM and DIM is eroded.) As resistance
increases, other strategies will become relatively more attractive. Already farmers predict cross-breed cattle 
will increase more than Zebu cattle, and in one village with high resistance, farmers envision an increase
in pure trypanotolerant cattle. Increasing intensiﬁcation will increase the value of the beneﬁts obtained
from vector control and make all strategies more attractive. Intensiﬁcation also increases the proportion of 
Zebus, making control more necessary. The tendency for risk to decline as land change destroys riverine
galleries, and water infrastructure is established reduces the attractiveness of all strategies (but also slows the 
development of resistance).
This evaluation took place in a situation with high but stable prevalence. Farmers live with the problem of 
trypanosomosis which is not critically jeopardizing their livelihoods and our evaluation indicates that the 
low perceived return on vector control is the major reason for non-adoption of vector control. However, 
where large populations of susceptible cattle become exposed to disease for the ﬁrst time (as happened
after the droughts of the 1980s forced southwards migration of pastoralists into tsetse zones), losses from 
trypanosomosis and hence the beneﬁts from control will be much higher. Unfortunately, the factors 
encouraging group management—stable, homogenous groups, skills and experience with participation,
resource entitlements—are unlikely to be present for recently in-migrated environmental refugees, and in this
situation community-managed vector control, though worthwhile, is unlikely to emerge.
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11 Conclusion
Participatory evaluation—The process
We found that the participatory approach to the evaluation of community-based vector control was powerful 
and rewarding. The participatory process allowed self-correction and consensus building in a way that is
not possible using conventional questionnaires or surveys; information generated had both internal and
external validity. The results of participatory analyses are particularly meaningful because they use indicators
important to farmers, and involve farmers in the analysis. The tools are easy to understand and enjoyable to 
use. Participatory approaches are particularly good at giving insights into farmer perspectives and motivation.
They helped explain why community vector control, although highly attractive according to conventional
ﬁnancial analyses is rarely sustainable and never spontaneously adapted. In participatory evaluations, the 
process is also a product. We found giving farmers space to reﬂect on beneﬁts and costs, motivated them 
to continue with the farmer-funded and farmer-organized placement of screens. Another advantage is that 
evaluation results are available immediately to participants and within a few weeks to other stakeholders. 
In contrast, formal epidemiological and questionnaire data require much longer times for analysis: in this
project, a full year has been needed.
There were some weaknesses in the participatory approach. Data presented were coloured by farmers’ 
imperfect detection of changes and their wishes to inﬂuence the project. We suspected that the results 
were biased in this regard, resulting in an over-estimation of the beneﬁts of control. As epidemiological,
entomological and production data are also being collected, this hypothesis will be investigated further.
Participation is supposed to transform and empower, but we can hardly assert that the participatory process 
used radically challenged or altered the status quo. There were minor changes; carrying out the activities of 
vector control resulted in redistribution of power in villages generally favouring the younger, the livestock-
rich and those willing to take on new responsibilities. It also exposed technicians and government personnel
to participatory development, with potentially positive effects on the transparency and accountability of 
service delivery, but radical change was not easy to detect. In becoming mainstream, has participation lost 
its power to transgress? In fact we found that training farmers in Rational Drug Use had more potential to 
bring about institutional change—and to threaten vested interests. For example, after training, farmers felt 
empowered to assert their entitlement to treat their animals and to question the high prices charged by the 
private veterinarian.
Participation adds substantially to the cost of implementation. In this project, it accounted for more than
50% of project activity costs. Farmers also invested signiﬁcant time and money in the project. Some fear that 
participation can add new burdens to communities and allow governments to sidestep their responsibilities.
Despite these weaknesses, we continued to ﬁnd a participatory approach was the only reasonable way to 
support community vector control.
Participatory evaluation—The product
The participatory evaluation found that farmers perceived beneﬁts resulting from vector control in areas 
they identiﬁed as important to them. Vector control was integrated with other strategies for trypanosomosis
control. Farmers felt technically competent to carry out vector control using screens and insecticide-
treated animals. Village institutions emerged to organize vector control and farmers were conﬁdent in their
managerial ability.
There has been much debate on the conceded poor viability and non-adoption of community vector control.
One school of thought holds that this is due to lack of participation in the approach; others argue that 
there are fundamental and insurmountable economic reasons why long-term viability will not be achieved. 
This evaluation ﬁnds evidence to support both positions. In the short-term, failures may be largely due to 
lack of participation and poor approaches. The small-scale case study in six villages is a ‘proof of concept’
experiment; high-level participation was used and for the ﬁrst time, farmers paid for and placed screens
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without project interventions. This shows that communities can internalize the skills needed for vector 
control and manage the process of vector control using existing institutions and that higher-level participation
delivers at least short-term viability.
However, we conclude that long-term viability is threatened by the low perceived beneﬁts, the high
transaction costs and the low priority assigned to control in villages in south-west Burkina Faso. Freedom 
from tsetse is a non-essential good, which can be substituted for by other methods of trypanosomosis control
and which has poor perceived value for money; undeniably cheap, it is not necessarily affordable. And as a 
preventative measure, it is inevitably less attractive than the option of treating, which in conjunction with the 
keeping of trypanotolerant cattle, looks set to remain the dominant trypanosomosis control strategy for the 
foreseeable future.
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Annex 1 PRA data collection forms
Importance, avantages et inconvénients des stratégies de lutte contre la trypanosomose
Taux d’utilisation chez les éleveurs    Les 2 plus importants avantages et inconvénients   Le rang
d’importance avant, actuellement et dans l’avenir
Utilisation Dans l’avenir Avantage Inconvénient
1=plus
efﬁcace
1= plus 
facile
1=moins
chère
Métis / baoulé
1
2
1
2
Eviter les endroits
malsains
1
2
1
2
ISMM - vin
1
2
1
2
DIM - jaune
1
2
1
2
Médicaments
traditionnels
1
2
1
2
Les écrans
1
2
1
2
Pour-on ou 
pulvérisation
1
2
1
2
Nombre de personnes présentes :
Village :    Animateur :  Rapporteur :   Groupe
Utilisation de médicaments
Utilisation Dans l’avenir Source Prix
1=plus
efﬁcace 1= plus facile 1=moins cher
ISMM - vin
DIM - rouge
Comprimé blanc
Comprimé vert
Médicaments
traditionnels
Oxytétracycline
injectable
Gélule
Autres
Nombre de personnes présentes :
Village :    Animateur :  Rapporteur :   Groupe
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Les effets de la lutte
Perceptible oui/non La différence Prix Valeur
Moins de piqûre d’insectes
Plus de jours de trait
Jours par saison
Moins de dépenses pour les 
médicaments
FCFA par saison
Plus de litre du lait
Litre par semaine
Moins de mortalité
Nombre par an
Plus de naissances
Nombre par an
Plus de fumier
kg par saison
Autres
Nombre de personnes présentes :
Village :    Animateur :  Rapporteur    Groupe
Rôles et responsabilités pour la lutte
Autoévaluation   1 = niveau élevé, pas de problèmes 2 = niveau moyen, quelques problèmes  
3= niveau bas, plusieurs problèmes
Nom et/ou description
des acteurs
Nombre de 
personnes
Autoévaluation de la 
capacité
Autoévaluation de la 
durabilité
Gestion / direction
Pulvérisation des animaux
Traitement et mise en place des 
écrans
Cotisation pour imprégnation
des écrans
Nombre de personnes présentes :
Village :    Animateur :   Rapporteur   Group ;
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End notes
Estimates of the number of cattle at risk from trypanosomosis are taken from the document “Second
meeting of the Inter-Secretariat Co-ordinating Group for the FAO Programme for the control of African
Animal Trypanosomosis and related development”, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations in 2001. A more recent paper considers 46 million cattle to be at risk (Swallow, 
B. M. (2000) Impacts of Trypanosomiasis on African Agriculture, PAAT Technical and Scientiﬁc Series 2, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 52 pp.). Estimates of humans at risk are 
from the “Report on African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), Report of the Scientiﬁc Working Group 
meeting on African trypanosomiasis”, published in 2001 by the World Health Organization, Geneva, 
Switzerland.
Often quoted estimates of the costs of trypanosomosis vary from USD 1.3 billion (Kristjanson, P.M., 
Swallow, B.M., Rowlands G.J., Kruska, R.L. and de Leeuw, P.N. (1999), Measuring the costs of African
animal trypanosomosis, the potential beneﬁts of control and returns to research. Agricultural Systems 
59:79–98) to more than USD 12 billion per year (Hursey, B.S. and Slingenberg, J. (1995), The tsetse ﬂy and
its effects on agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. World Animal Review 3/4:67–73).
Estimates on the area currently controlled are given in Allsopp, R. (2001), Options for vector control
against trypanosomiasis in Africa. Trends in Parasitology 17(1):15–19. This estimate includes large areas 
in Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, where control has almost certainly stopped following recent political
disturbances.
The project is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
implemented by ILRI and with national and regional research and delivery institutes as partners.
These community-based vector control and Rational Drug Use interventions are described in detail in
project working papers 1–5.
See Estrella, M. and Gaventa, J. (1998), Who counts reality: Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation, a 
literature review. IDS working paper 70, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK for a summary of 
PME origins and ideological background.
Modiﬁed from Naryan-Parker, D. (1993), Participatory evaluation tools for managing change in water and
sanitation, World Bank Technical Paper 207, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
The deﬁnition of Rational Drug Use is taken from the WHO 1985 meeting, Conference of Experts on the 
Rational Use of Drugs, convened by the World Health Organization in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Papers published on these projects include: Kabore, I., Delafosse-Amsler, S. and Bauer, B. (1995), Lutte 
contra les mouches tsé-tsé (Glossina spp.) et les tiques par application epicutane de pyrethrinoides sur 
le bétail, dans les différentes zones du Burkina Faso. Importance de la participation communautaire. 7th 
International Conference of Institutions of Tropical Veterinary Medicine, Berlin, and Bauer, B., Delafosse-
Amsler, S., Kabore I. and Kamuanga, M. (1999), Improvement of cattle productivity through rapid
alleviation of African animal trypanosomosis by integrated disease management practices in the agro-
pastoral zone of Yale, Burkina Faso. Tropical Animal Health and Production 31:89–102; summaries from 
grey literature are given in Project Working Paper 2 in this series entitled “Participative trypanosomosis
control in Burkina Faso: Lessons learned, ways forward”.
 Treatment failures to suramin were reported in 1927 shortly after its introduction (Knowles (1927), 
quoted in Anenea, B.M., Onahb, D.N. and Nawab, Y. (2001), Drug resistance in pathogenic African
trypanosomes: What hopes for the future? Veterinary Parasitology 96:83–100). Resistance to homidium,
isometamidium and diminazene was also reported within a few years of their introduction, and resistance
has been experimentally induced to cymelarsan the newest trypanocide, see Geerts S. and Holmes P.H. 
(1998), Drug management and parasite resistance in animal trypanosomiasis in Africa. PAAT (Programme 
Against African Trypanosomiasis) Technical and Scientiﬁc Series 1, Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, Rome, Italy.
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 The latest authoritative estimate of the cost of drug development is from Tufts Centre for the Study of 
Drug Development which places the costs of drug development at USD 802 million, this updates a 
previous study a decade ago which estimated the cost at USD 231 million. Some consumer advocacy 
NGOs claim that the cost of drug development is considerably over-estimated (four to ﬁvefold) by the 
pharmaceutical industries. Estimates of the value of the market for trypanosomosis are from Sones, K. 
(2001), Pharmaceutical companies; partners or enemies, ICPTV Newsletter 3.
 Adapted from Pretty, J.N. (1994), Alternative systems of inquiry for a sustainable agriculture. IDS Bulletin 
25(2):37–47, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK.
 In a study carried out in the same area in the late 1990s, parasitological prevalence was as follows:
Zebu Métis Baoulé N
Cross-sectional study 2.9% 3.3% 0.3% 2000
ISMM block study 8.7 14.3 11.5 726
Longitudinal study 16.4 13.6 12.8 306
See Woitag, T. (2003), Untersuchungen zum Vorkommen und zur Verbreitung von medikamentenresistenten Trypanosomenpopulationen
in Rinderherden der Provinz Kénédougou im Südwesten von Burkina Faso, Westafrika. PhD Dissertation, Free University of Berlin,
Berlin, Germany.
 See Hanotte, O., Bradley, D.G., Ochieng, J.W., Verjee, Y., Hill, E.W., Edward, J. and Rege, O. (2002), 
African pastoralism: Genetic imprints of origins and migrations. Science 296:336–396, for further 
information on the origin of African cattle.
 Increased cross-breeding in herds monitored in the Ivory Coast is discussed in the following paper: 
Zakpa, L.G., d’Ieteren, G., Leak, S.G.A. and Coulibaly, L. (2001), Breed choice and trypanosomosis
risk, ICPTV Newsletter 4. In the same bulletin Hill et al. report on the introgression of Zebu genes into
trypanotolerant populations (Hill, E.W., MacHugh, D.E. and Bradley, D.G. (2001), Inter-relationships
among African livestock genotypes and characterization of their adaptation with special reference to 
disease resistance.)
 Recommendations for actions to be taken in the presence of resistance taken from ICPTV (1999). ‘Bovine
trypanocidal drug resistance: Proposed guidelines for action based on workshop discussions. Workshop 
Proceedings 31 May–4 June, Nairobi, Kenya.’
 From Furubotn, E.G. and Rudolf R. (1997), ‘Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the 
new institutional economics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press’ quoted in Benham, A. and
Benham, L. (2001). The costs of exchange. Ronald Coase Institute Working Paper, Ronald Coase Institute,
St Louis, USA. 
 Reported in Kamuanga, M., Tano, K., Pokou, K., Jabbar, M. and d’Ieteren G. (2001), Farmer preferences
of cattle breeds, their market values and prospects for improvement in West Africa: A summary review, 
ICPTV Newsletter 4.
 This study was carried out in the same villages in the previous phase of the project. See Ouédraogo D. 
(2002), Analyse socio-économique des pratiques de gestion de la trypanosomose animale et les facteurs 
associés au développement de la chimiorésistance dans la province du Kenedougou (Burkina Faso). PHD 
thesis, University of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
 The non-market beneﬁts of livestock are discussed in Moll, H. (2005), Costs and beneﬁts of livestock 
systems and the role of market and non-market relationships, Agricultural Economics 32:181–193.
 See Shaw, A. (2001), for a review and summary of economic/ﬁnancial analyses of tsetse control projects, 
Guiding economic principles for strategic planning in tsetse and trypanosomosis control/eradication in
West Africa, a paper presented at the FAO/IAEA workshop: Strategic planning of area-wide tsetse and
trypanosomosis control in West Africa. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 21–25 May 2001.
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 A crude sensitivity analysis suggests a range of likely beneﬁts per farmer from USD 60 to 380.
 A general template developed for Francophone Africa is given in CIRAD–EMTV. (1995), Les groupements
d’éleveurs—leur rôle, Fiche no. 4, Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour 
le développement – Département d’élevage et médecine vétérinaire, Montpellier, France.
 Taken from Grace, D. (2001). Community Animal Health in Chad; a situational analysis. AU–IBAR, 
Nairobi, Kenya.
 A schema for classifying goods is as follows:
Subtractable Non subtractable
Excludable Private goods Club goods
Non excludable Common Pool goods Public goods
This implies vector control using animal or cloth can be characterized as a public good (non subtractable 
and non excludable). However, Holden (1999), who provides the most detailed application of economic
categorization schema to animal health, considers vector control at community level to be a Common
Pool Good (The economics of delivery of veterinary services. Revue Scientiﬁque et Technique 18(2):425–
439). Common Pool Goods are subtractable – they can be ‘used-up’ by over-consumption, resulting
in less for the future and for others (deforestation, over ﬁshing). Because they are not excludable there 
is an incentive to over-use. In practice, most animal health goods are mixed, and vector control is no
exception. There are signiﬁcant private beneﬁts to animal baits, and even screens have some private good 
characteristics as people who work next to them will receive individual beneﬁts in terms of less bites and
associated illness from nuisance ﬂies.
 See summary in Rasmussen, L. and Meinzen-Dick, R. (1995), Local organizations for natural 
resource management: Lessons from theoretical and empirical literature. IFPRI Discussion Paper, IFPRI 
(International Food Policy Research Institute), Washington, DC, USA.
 See discussions and analysis in Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions
for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, and Wade, R. (1987), The 
management of common property resources: Finding a cooperative solution, in Research Observer 
2(2):219–234, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
 In ‘face’ cultures, external shame is considered to be more important than internal shame. External
shame occurs if the behaviour is observed by others; internal shame is felt even if no one observes or 
manifests disapproval. Kandal and Lazear develop a model that explicitly takes account of such shame-
based sanctions (Kandel, E. and Lazear, E.P. (1992), Pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political 
Economy 100(4):801–817).
 Kremer, M. and Snyder, C.M. (2000), Why are drugs more proﬁtable than vaccines? Working Paper 9833, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9833, consulted March 2005.
 See Kamuanga, M. (2003), Socio-economic and cultural factors in the research and control of 
trypanosomiasis, (PAAT Technical and Scientiﬁc Series 4, Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome, Italy, for a summary discussion of some ‘non-participatory’ participatory projects 
in West and East Africa.
 The Service de Lutte contre la Trypanosomiase Animale et les Vecteurs (SLTAV) in Ivory Coast has been
carrying out tsetse control activities since 1978 and the last phase concentrated on community-based
delivery reported full ‘participation’ in buying and placing screens in 86% of villages; however, level of 
participation was not deﬁned.
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